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PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND THE CLASH BETWEEN
IMPARTIALITY AND GROUP REPRESENTATION*
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG**
MARY ELLEN POWERS***
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court decided Swain v. Alabama' and held
that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove black jurors
from an array was constitutionally permissible, the decision received
more than a modest amount of criticism.2 Swain appeared to be out of
step with other decisions of the Supreme Court of the 1960's, especially
with those of the Warren Court.3 These other decisions strongly con-
demned actions on racial grounds by government officials and always
,found them impermissible.4
Although the criticism did not immediately prompt either the
Supreme Court or state courts to reject the Swain analysis, more re-
cently there has been a movement by some state courts to view Swain
as representing undesirable law and to interpret differently the jury
* This article was delivered as the Pearl and Lawrence I. Gerber Memorial Lecture at
the University of Maryland School of Law on December 3, 1981.
** Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
* Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C.
1. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
2. See, e.g., Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases.- The Negro Defendant
and His Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L. Rav. 448 (1966); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Consti-
tutional Blueprintfor the Perpetuation ofthe All- White Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157 (1966).
3. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (rejecting argument that anti-misce-
genation law was valid as applying equally to everyone); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399
(1964) (rejecting argument that state law requiring a candidate's race to be on the ballot was
valid because it applied equally to all candidates).
4. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
559-63 (1978).
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trial provisions in their own constitutions. Some state decisions now
bar the use of race and certain other classifications as a basis for strik-
ing jurors by means of peremptory challenges.5 They find that the
Court's decision in Taylor v. Louisiana,6 holding that a criminal de-
fendant is entitled to a jury selected from a cross-section of the commu-
nity, impels abandonment of Swain.' Although the trend is far from
overwhelming, it is significant, especially in view of many commenta-
tors' favorable reactions to these decisions.8 This reaction plus the ini-
tial criticism of Swain may lead additional courts to reconsider whether
counsel properly may use race, other "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" clas-
sifications, and additional distinctions delineating social groups in jury
selection.9
This discussion will suggest that the recent decisions prohibiting
the use of certain traits as grounds for peremptorily challenging jurors
are misconceived, that they miss the basic point of peremptory chal-
lenges, that they miscast the cross-section of the community require-
ment, and that in the long run they may do more harm to the litigation
process than does the Swain rule. There are problems with peremptory
challenges, but they are not those superficially identified in the recent
5. The two most important decisions - People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d
748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) - are discussed at some length herein.
6. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
7. Thus far, the decisions do not maintain that Swain has effectively been overruled.
Instead, they use state constitutions as the bases for their holdings. But the opinions strongly
imply that Swain and Taylor are not consistent.
8. See, e.g., Brown, McGuire & Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manpulative
Device in Criminal Trials.- Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 192 (1978); Com-
ment, People v. Wheeler: Calfornia's Answer to Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 16 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 897 (1979) (hereinafter cited as San Diego Comment); Case Comment, Peo-
ple v. Wheeler: Peremptory Challenge May Not Be Used to Remove Jurors Solely/or Group
Association, 58 N.C. L. REV. 152 (1979); Case Comment, Impartial Jury - Restricting the
Peremptory Challenge - People v. Wheeler, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1082 (1979). One com-
mentary approved the result but not the courts' reasoning. Note, The De/endant's Right to
Object to Prosecutorial Misuse o/the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1770 (1979)
(hereinafter cited as Harvard Note). Some doubts concerning Taylor's interpretation have
been expressed, however. See, e.g., Comment, 4 New Standard/or Peremptory Challenges:
People v. Wheeler, 32 STAN. L. REV. 189 (1979); Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Mean-
ing o/Jury Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177 (1980); Case Note, Prosecutorial Misuse of the
Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Discrete Groups from the Petit Jury: Commonwealth v.
Soares, 21 B.C.L. REV. 1197 (1980).
9. In jury selection cases courts look to exclusion of identifiable groups that might be
thought of as having different values, attitudes or experiences from those included on juries.
The groups identified thus far are those that receive some sort of heightened scrutiny in
equal protection cases and others that might be said to be "distinctive." See Duren v. Mis-
souri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). See generaly Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualfed
Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals Alternatives/or Coping with the Complexities of Modern
Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REv. 887, 927-33 (1981).
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cases that stand in opposition to Swain. In fact, the discussion will sug-
gest that the focus on restricting the bases for peremptory challenges
distracts attention from more important issues that should be consid-
ered in attempting to select fair juries. The recent decisions do point to
a real need to increase minority participation on juries, but they do not
provide an acceptable formula for doing so. This discussion, which
concentrates on criminal rather than civil cases,10 will attempt to offer a
better one.
II. THE ROLE OF THE CHALLENGE
A. Generaly
The exercise of challenges is the last stage in the selection of a
jury." After a venire has been drawn, usually at random, 2 from a
pool of qualified jurors, the prospective jurors are subject to voir dire, a
face-to-face examination by the judge and by counsel to determine the
impartiality of prospective jurors with respect to the particular case to
be decided. 3 At this stage, the attorney may use a peremptory chal-
10. Our discussion examines selection ofjuries in criminal rather than civil cases for two
reasons: first, Swain and the recent cases challenging it are criminal cases; second, the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases binds the states, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968), whereas the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases does not,
see Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875). Unless the Supreme Court were to say that no
defendant can receive a fair trial under the Swain rule - something it is unlikely to say in
light of a history in which Swain has been the traditional approach - states would not have
to abandon Swain in civil litigation, even if they were forced to do so in criminal cases. The
criminal case therefore presents a slightly more important context in which to consider the
use of peremptory challenges.
11. There are several stages in the jury selection process. First, a list of eligible jurors is
compiled by means of voter registration lists, directories, a key-man system, or similar meth-
ods. From that pool, a venire is randomly selected for service during a particular court term.
After excuses for hardship, health, or similar reasons, the venire is examined and challenges
are made. The petit jury is selected from those jurors who remain. For a discussion of the
mechanics ofjury selection, see Simon & Marshall, The Jury System, in THE RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED IN LAW AND ACTION 211, 214-17 (S. Nagel ed. 1972).
12. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1864a (1976). The background of the current federal approach
to selection is set forth in Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 9, at 909-16.
13. See Babcock, koir Dire. Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545
(1975). The method of conducting voir dire differs among jurisdictions in several important
respects. First, in some jurisdictions, as well as in the federal courts, the judge may ask
questions and may permit counsel to do so in lieu of or in addition to judicial questioning.
More states give the primary role of questioning to counsel. The most common state rule
provides for examination by the judge, followed by additional questions from counsel.
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 15-2.4 commentary at 24 (1978); A. GINGER,
JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS § 7.11 (1980). Second, the permissible scope of ex-
amination varies. In some jurisdictions, voir dire is restricted to questions that will provide a
basis for challenges for cause. See STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 15-2.4 com-
mentary at 25 (1978). In most states, questions are permitted if they relate to the exercise of
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lenge to exclude a prospective juror from the panel or he may challenge
a venireman for cause. Challenges for cause are unlimited, but subject
to judicial control. A judicial finding of either implied or actual bias
will support such a challenge.' 4 A court will infer bias from the exist-
ence of certain family or business relationships between the juror and
parties to the action, or from other special interests in the outcome or
the participants.' 5 A challenge for actual bias requires a finding that
the juror is prejudiced with respect to the particular defendant on
trial. 16
Challenges for cause have been criticized as too narrow to elimi-
nate effectively any but the most blatant biases.' 7 The combination of
restrictive voir dire procedures - for example limitations on the right
of counsel to question jurors directly, and on the scope of inquiry 8 -
and narrow grounds for challenges for cause make it extremely difficult
to discover, and even more difficult to prove, that a prospective juror
has subconscious biases that will affect his ability to be impartial.
Thus, both prosecutors and defense counsel have come to rely on the
peremptory to remove jurors they suspect of prejudice. By definition,
the peremptory challenge does not require an explanation. Although
no reason need be given for exercising this challenge, statutes and rules
limit the number available to each side ranging, for example, in a capi-
tal case from four in Virginia to twenty-six in California. 19 Obviously,
either challenges for cause or peremptory challenges. Id. However, trial judges have con-
siderable discretion to limit questioning which they consider to be irrelevant or insubstan-
tial. See cases cited in I E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONs 61-63 (3d ed. 1977). Third, questions can be addressed either to individual
jurors or to the panel as a whole, with significantly different results. Jurors will often fail to
speak up in response to a question directed to the entire panel, because of a fear of speaking
in front of others or of disclosing personal feelings. Babcock, supra, at 547-48.
These differences in the methods of conducting voir dire examinations have signifi-
cant effects on the amount of knowledge available to counsel in exercising challenges. See
generally id.; Note, Voir Dire: Establihing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of
Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493 (1975).
For a discussion of the functions of voir dire, see A. GINGER, supra, §§ 7.12-.24.
14. A. GINGER, supra note 13, at § 7.2. The grounds for challenges for cause are usually
statutory. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1071-1074 (West 1970).
15. See Babcock, supra note 13, at 549.
16. See id. at 550.
17. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 243-44 (1968).
18. See supra note 13.
19. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 282-83 (1977). Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 24(b) provides that in a capital case the government and the defendant may
exercise 20 peremptories apiece. In a prosecution where a prison sentence longer than one
year is a possible penalty, the prosecutor gets six challenges and the defendant gets ten. If a
fine or prison sentence of less than one year may be imposed, each side is entitled to three
peremptories.
In 1976 the Supreme Court proposed an amendment to rule 24(b) that would have
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the availability of peremptories has a substantial effect on the ability of
parties to control the composition of the jury.2 °
The peremptory challenge historically has enabled defendants to
eliminate prospective jurors whom they suspect to be biased against
them.2' Although the Court has held that the peremptory is not a con-
stitutional requirement,22 it always has been considered one of the most
effective means of securing an impartial jury and of satisfying the de-
fendant of that impartiality.23 Since the late nineteenth century, the
reduced the number of challenges available in all criminal cases, and also equalized the
number available to the two sides in noncapital felony prosecutions. 425 U.S. 1157, 1162
(1976). Congress rejected that proposal. Pub. L. No. 95-78 § 2(c), 91 Stat. 319 (1977).
The majority of states provide for equal numbers of challenges for both parties. In
about 20 states, the defendant has more challenges than the government in prosecutions of
more serious crimes. J. VAN DYKE, supra, at 282-84.
20. The procedure employed for exercising peremptories also affects their utility. Some
states use a "struck jury" system in which a venire is seated that is equal in size to the
desired number of petit jurors plus the number of peremptories available to both sides. The
defense counsel and prosecutor alternately strike jurors until their challenges are exhausted
and only the petit jury remains. This method of selection allows attorneys to exercise their
challenges in a much more sophisticated manner because they can compare all the prospec-
tive jurors before making a judgment. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 146-47. Another
common selection procedure is to draw a panel of the desired size from the venire and to
sequester the remaining jurors. After voir dire, one attorney challenges jurors he considers
undesirable. Each challenged juror is immediately replaced from among the remaining ve-
niremen, and each replacement can, in turn, be removed. When one party is satisfied with
the panel, he presents it to the opposing counsel, who follows the same procedure. The
process continues until each side has exhausted its challenges or until both are satisfied with
the panel. Under this system, the replacement for a struck juror is an unknown quantity;
thus counsel is unlikely to strike a juror unless he is affirmatively dissatisfied. JOINT COMM.
ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., ALI-ABA, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMI-
NAL CASES § 332 (3d ed. 1974).
United States v. Blovin, 666 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1981), describes some of the different
systems for exercising peremptory challenges. The court upheld the following system:
strikes are exercised in rounds with the sides alternating who goes first; after one side exer-
cises its challenges to jurors seated in the box, the other side exercises its challenges before
the box is refilled for the next round; and the defendant goes last and must exercise his final
challenges without knowing who will replace challenged jurors.
21. Blackstone wrote that the challenge had two additional purposes: first, to allow a
defendant to remove any jurors whom he intuitively dislikes, thus insuring that he has "a
good opinion of the jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him"; and second, to
permit the exclusion of jurors whom the defendant has alienated through his voir dire ques-
tioning. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353 (1783). The United States Supreme
Court long has recognized the important role of the challenge in fulfilling these functions.
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70
(1887) and Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)).
22. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
23. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). For an interesting discussion of the
effectiveness with which the challenge was exercised in one federal court, see Zeisel & Dia-
mond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in Federal
District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1978).
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prosecutor's right to exercise challenges also has been recognized.24 In
theory, each side will be able to identify and exclude those jurors most
strongly biased in favor of the opposition. The result will be a jury
from which extremes of bias have been removed, and which should
reasonably approximate the impartial jury envisioned by the sixth
amendment.25
In practice, however, attorneys have less than perfect information
about the predispositions and hidden biases of prospective jurors.
Thus, they naturally have tended to rely on stereotypes, common sense
judgments, and even common prejudices in deciding whether a juror
with a given age, race, sex, religion, ethnic background, and occupation
will act impartially toward a particular defendant. It is not surprising,
therefore, that in some cases attorneys have made race or sex or reli-
gion the dominant, sometimes the exclusive, criterion for deciding
whom to challenge.
B. Swain v. Alabama
The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of using stereo-
types in Swain v. Alabama.26 Swain arose in Talladega County, Ala-
bama, where twenty-six percent of those eligible for grand and petit
juries were black. Yet, from 1953 until Swain, only ten to fifteen per-
cent of those who served on the grand jury had been black, and no
black resident had ever been selected for petit jury duty. In the Swain
case, the state charged a black defendant with raping a white female.
Two blacks served on the grand jury that indicted the defendant, but
none was on the petit jury that convicted him and sentenced him to
death. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges to remove all six blacks from the venire violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 27
24. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). The prosecutor's and defendant's chal-
lenges derive from different historical events. While the history is inconclusive, it is often
used to support the argument that the challenge was designed only to protect the accused.
For differing perspectives on the history of the challenge, compare Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 212-19 (1965) with J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 147-50. See also Babcock,
supra note 13, at 555 n.37. The discussion herein explains why both sides may need and
want to exercise challenges.
25. For a discussion of "impartiality," see infra text accompanying notes 76-86.
26. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Swain involved the "struck jury" system. See supra note 20.
Approximately 100 jurors were called. Excuses and challenges reduced the venire to ap-
proximately 75. The prosecutor struck two and the defendant one until a jury of 12 was
chosen. Eight blacks were originally called. Two were exempt and the prosecutor struck six.
27. The defendant argued in the trial court that the "systematic and arbitrary method"
of selecting jurors violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court treated this
argument as an equal protection challenge, 380 U.S. at 221, because Duncan v. Louisiana,
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The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim, adopting Ala-
bama's argument that the essential nature of peremptory challenges re-
quires that they be unaccompanied by stated reasons and unfettered by
judicial scrutiny in order to secure juries that, in fact and in the opinion
of the parties, are fair and impartial.2 Thus, the Court explicitly ap-
proved the exercise of challenges "on grounds normally thought irrele-
vant to legal proceedings. ' 29 According to the Court, the peremptory
challenge by definition is exercised without a stated reason, without
inquiry, so that veniremen may be struck "whether they be Negroes,
Catholics, accountants or those with blue eyes."3 Justice White wrote
for the majority that "the question a prosecutor or defense counsel
must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is
in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is less likely to
be."' I The Court recognized that veniremen cannot always be judged
solely as individuals for the purpose of exercising peremptory chal-
lenges, because a counsel must base his challenges on only limited
knowledge of the jurors, which may include their group affiliations or
characteristics.32 This system, the Court suggested, would eliminate ex-
tremes of partiality by eliminating any jurors that the parties perceived
as biased. 3
Any attempt to subject the peremptory challenge to scrutiny for
reasonableness would therefore destroy the essential nature of the chal-
lenge - a challenge that is "one of the most important of the rights
secured to the accused."34 Thus, the presumption in any given case
must be that the prosecutor, like the defendant, is exercising his chal-
lenges to secure an impartial jury. The presumption was not overcome
by allegations that the prosecutor removed all blacks from Swain's jury
simply because they were black.
The defendant in Swain also claimed that prosecutors in Talladega
County had used their challenges to prevent blacks from serving on
any petit jury for almost fifteen years. In dicta, Justice White suggested
that the use of peremptories to exclude all blacks from juries in all
criminal cases might violate the equal protection clause because it
391 U.S. 145 (1968), had not yet been decided and the jury trial right of the sixth amend-
ment was not yet binding on the states.
28. 380 U.S. at 212.
29. Id. at 220.
30. Id. at 212.
31. Id. at 220-21.
32. Id
33. Id. at 219.
34. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894), quoted in Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
19821
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would deny blacks the same opportunity enjoyed by whites 35 to partici-
pate in the judicial process. In such a case the presumption of the pros-
ecutor's constitutional use of the peremptory would be sufficiently
rebutted.36 In Swain itself, the Court held that the defendant failed to
prove that regular absence of blacks on the petit jury was due totally to
the prosecutor's exercise of peremptories. He failed to show that the
prosecutor was determined to strike all blacks, regardless of trial
considerations.
Commentators sometimes ignore a third part of the Swain chal-
lenge,37 the part that may be the most important today. The defendant
contended that the low percentage of blacks called for jury service,
compared to their percentage of the community, demonstrated discrim-
ination in selecting the array from which the jury that decided the case
was selected .3  The Supreme Court responded:
a defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally entitled to
demand a proportionate number of his race on the jury which tries
him nor on the venire or jury roll from which petit jurors are
drawn. . . . Neither the jury roll nor the venire need be a perfect
mirror of the community or accurately reflect the proportionate
strength of every identifiable group.39
The defendant's contention that blacks were underrepresented on jury
venires plus the historical evidence concerning the absence of blacks on
county juries led the dissent to conclude that a prima facie case of ex-
clusion had been made. A point often overlooked is that the dissent
was narrowly written, urging only this limited holding:
where, as here, a Negro defendant proves that Negroes constitute a
35. The Court said that the petitioner had "not laid the proper predicate" for raising this
kind of claim. 380 U.S. at 226-27. Justice Harlan, in a one paragraph concurring opinion,
observed that the Court did not decide the question whether continuous systematic exclusion
of blacks through use of peremptory challenges would be unconstitutional. Id. at 228.
36. Apparently, the Court was leaving open the possibility that exclusion of all blacks by
the government might make the peremptory challenge system a cover for a state policy to
disqualify blacks from serving on petit juries. The Supreme Court had outlawed early the
exclusion of blacks. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Thus, under Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), an administrative scheme designed to provide total
exclusion might be unconstitutional.
If unconstitutional systematic discrimination were proved, fashioning a remedy
would be difficult. Reversing one conviction would seem to be inadequate. Reversing all
convictions during the period of discrimination would seem to be too costly. Perhaps an
injunction against total exclusion in the future would be all that could reasonably be ex-
pected. This, together with a warning that if the pattern continues all future judgments of
guilt might be overturned, would be a substantial deterrent.
37. See, e.g., Harvard Note, supra note 8; San Diego Comment, supra note 8.
38. 380 U.S. at 205.
39. Id. at 208.
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substantial segment of the population, that Negroes are qualified
to serve as jurors, and that none or only a token number has
served on juries over an extended period of time, a prima facie
case of the exclusion of Negroes from juries is then made out; that
the State, under our settled decisions, is then called upon to show
that such exclusion has been brought about "for some reason other
than racial discrimination" . . .; and. . . the State wholly fails to
meet the prima facie case of systematic and purposeful racial dis-
crimination by showing that it has been accomplished by the use
of a peremptory challenge system unless the State also shows that
it is not involved in the misuse of such a system to prevent all
Negroes from ever sitting on any jury.'
The dissent explicitly stated that their holding would not "mean that
where systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury service has not been
shown a prosecutor's motives are subject to question or judicial inquiry
when he excludes Negroes or any other group from sitting on a jury in
a particular case.""
The Swain Court thus recognized two possible motives for exercis-
ing challenges against black jurors. The first - the use of race as a
proxy by which to identify probable prejudice in a particular case -
was explicitly approved by all the justices, except Justice Black who
concurred in the result without opinion. The Court emphasized the
importance of protecting the inviolability of the peremptory strike, con-
cluding that a court should not scrutinize a prosecutor's motive for
challenging blacks in a particular case. The second - the use of chal-
lenges to keep blacks off all juries - was not approved. If it is possible
to prove an unlawful exercise of challenges under Swain, a defendant
must show that the prosecution systematically and totally, or almost
totally, excluded blacks over a period of time.
Although courts interpreting Swain have maintained that this bur-
den of proof of systematic exclusion is not insurmountable, few, if any,
defendants have yet succeeded in meeting it.4" This may suggest that
Swain's test really is impossible to satisfy and that a concern about
40. Id. at 244-45 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
42. For cases in which defendants have failed to meet the Swain test, see, e.g., United
States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978); United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Carlton, 456 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), af'd, 620 F.2d 286 (2d Ci.
1980); United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated sub non.
United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); State v. Stewart, 255 Kan. 410, 591
P.2d 166 (1979); King v. State Rds. Comm'n, 284 Md. 368, 396 A.2d 267 (1979); Common-
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systematic exclusion of racial minorities should lead to adoption of a
less demanding standard. Or it may suggest that while the test is de-
manding, it is not beyond satisfaction and the reason it has not been
met is that prosecutors generally attempt to keep black jurors off some,
but not all, juries. We conclude that the latter is likely, for reasons that
we will discuss in Section IV.
III. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AFTER TAYLOR V LOUISIANA
Ten years after Swain, in Taylor v. Louisiana,43 the Supreme Court
for the first time interpreted the sixth amendment to require that the
jury venire be selected from a representative cross-section of the com-
munity. The Court indicated that representation of diverse segments of
the population in the jury pool would improve the chances of assuring
impartiality in the jury." Further, the Court noted that community
participation in the administration of justice would enhance the legiti-
wealth v. Green, 246 Pa. Super. 472, 400 A.2d 182 (1979). See generaly Brown, McGuire &
Winters, supra note 8.
In two cases, federal judges exercised their supervisory powers to remedy alleged
abuses of prosecutors' challenges. In United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243, 1248-
50 (E.D. La. 1974), Judge Rubin granted the defendant a new trial under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 33 even though he found that the Swain test had not been met. The
judge held that the underrepresentation of blacks on the initial venire, and the prosecutor's
challenge of six of the seven blacks on the venire resulted in an unfair trial. In United States
v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473-74 (D. Conn. 1976), Judge Newman disallowed the pros-
ecutor's challenges against black veniremen and ordered the United States Attorney's Office
to keep records on the number of blacks removed from petit juries by the exercise of
prosecutorial challanges, so as to help future defendants prove a Swain violation. On a
petition for mandamus, the Second Circuit vacated the trial court's ruling, holding that the
evidence of discrimination was inadequate to meet the Swain standard. United States v.
Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1977).
The one case that may be an exception to the "no win" record under Swain is State
v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751, 754 (La. 1979). The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the
convictions of defendants who claimed systematic exclusion of blacks from petit juries. The
case was remanded for a new trial because the state had failed to offer evidence that there
was no discrimination based simply on race.
43. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
44. Id. at 530. The representative cross-section rule has its roots in a line of Supreme
Court opinions beginning 35 years before Taylor. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187, 194 (1946) (exclusion of women makes jury "less representative of the community");
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("The American tradition ... necessar-
ily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community."); Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (proper functioning of democracy requires that a
jury be "a cross-section of the community"); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (jury
should be "truly representative of the community").
Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), concluded
that "[w]hen any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury
service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable." Id. at 503.
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macy of the outcome in the eyes of the community as a whole.45
Taylor, a male, was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and was
sentenced to death. Claiming unconstitutional systematic exclusion of
women, he had moved unsuccessfully before trial to challenge the petit
jury venire drawn for the term of court in which his trial was sched-
uled. The state stipulated that fifty-three percent of the persons eligible
for jury service in the district were female, that no more than ten per-
cent of the names in the jury wheel were women, and that their under-
representation was the product of a state law barring women from jury
service unless they filed a written declaration of a desire to serve.
While recognizing that women were not absolutely barred from
service, the Court had little difficulty in finding systematic exclusion of
most women. It said that
[t]he purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power - to make available the common sense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prose-
cutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overcondi-
tioned or biased response of a judge. This prophylactic vehicle is
not provided if thejurypool is made up of only special segments of
the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the
pool. Community participation in the administration of the crimi-
nal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heri-
tage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system.46
In the last substantive paragraph of the majority opinion, the
Court said that it had imposed
no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the
community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the popu-
lation. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular com-
position . . .; but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or
venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically ex-
clude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be
reasonably representative thereof.47
45. 419 U.S. at 530.
46. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 538. The Court's refusal to extend the cross-section rule to a petit jury can be
explained by several factors. First, random selection often results in under- or overrepresen-
tation of particular groups on a venire. In addition, the removal of jurors for cause may, in a
given case, result in the absence of a particular group from the petit jury. Second, the re-
quirement that specific groups be represented on a petit jury would create tremendous ad-
ministrative problems and the opportunity for abuse. In each case a court would have to
identify which groups of the population were relevant and, thus, must be included. To in-
sure inclusion would require an affirmative selection of a jury, creating a much greater
chance of manipulation and abuse than is possible under our current system of merely ex-
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The language chosen by the Court could not be much clearer. The
holding related to jury pools or venires, not to the composition of juries
in particular cases. Yet, some commentators have argued that the deci-
sion's rationale compels its extension to the selection of particular petit
juries.4" Specifically, they contend that the Court's reasoning in Swain
is irreconcilable with that in Taylor because Swain sanctions the exclu-
sion from the petit jury of those groups whose exclusion from the ve-
nire is condemned by Taylor.4 9 They conclude that, if it is the interplay
of diverse groups that guarantees impartiality on the venire, then delib-
erate attempts to exclude certain groups from the petit jury will pre-
sumptively destroy that impartiality and violate the sixth amendment.5 °
In two important decisions, state supreme courts recently have adopted
this reasoning.
In People v. Wheeler,5" the Supreme Court of California held that
the exercise of peremptories on the basis of group bias violates the state
constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury. Wheeler and
Willis were convicted of murdering a grocery store owner in the course
of a robbery. The principal trial issue was identification. Both defend-
ants were black, and the man they were accused of murdering was
white. As the prosecution began to strike black jurors, defense counsel
made a record of their race to lay the foundation for a claim that the
prosecutor impermissibly struck jurors on racial grounds. The prosecu-
tor declined to explain his conduct in striking jurors, and the trial judge
indicated that the prosecutor had no obligation to offer an explanation.
Whereas the trial judge ruled that attorneys could peremptorily strike
whomever they wished, the California Supreme Court held otherwise.
The court reasoned that the right to an impartial jury entitled a
defendant to a petit jury "that is as near an approximation of the ideal
cross-section of the community as the process of random draw per-
mits."' 52 It inferred that the purpose of the cross-section requirement is
to "achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of the
diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group exper-
cluding jurors from the randomly-selected venire. For a further discussion of these
problems, see Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge:. Representation of Groups on Petit
Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1732 (1977).
48. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 168-69; Comment, People v. Wheeler, Peremptory
Challenges -A New Interpretation, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv. 370, 386 (1978); Note, supra note
47, at 1731.
49. See Comment, supra note 48, at 379-80.
50. See, e.g., id. at 379.
51. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). In a capital case in Califor-
nia, the prosecution and the defense each have 26 peremptory challenges. Jurors are called,
questioned, and struck one at a time. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1981).
52. 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
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iences."' 53 Therefore, any attempt to exclude jurors simply because
they belong to minority groups results in a jury dominated by the
prejudices of the majority. The court concluded that the presumed
group bias that triggers the challenge of blacks from the petit jury "is
indistinguishable from the group perspective we seek to encourage by
the cross-section rule."54
The court further held that the purpose of peremptory challenges
is to remove only jurors who hold "specific biases" - i.e., biases con-
cerning the particular case, or the parties or the participants at trial."5
Thus, under its analysis, only challenges intended to further this lim-
ited goal are constitutional.
The problem then is how to distinguish between lawful and unlaw-
ful exercises of the peremptory. The Supreme Court of California
adopted a procedure proposed by commentators to identify and rem-
edy unlawful uses of the challenge. Under this method, all parties are
presumed to be exercising their challenges on legally permissible
grounds. However, the opposing party may rebut that presumption by
making a prima facie showing that the challenger is striking jurors on
the ground of group bias alone. A showing that the challenge has been
used to remove a disproportionate number of jurors in a particular
group will suffice. The exercise of challenges by both prosecutors and
defendants is subject to these limitations.56
53. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
54. Id
55. As examples of specific bias the court listed the facts that ajuror has an arrest record,
has been a victim of crime, or has relatives in law enforcement. These factors "are essen-
tially neutral with respect to the various groups represented on the venire: the characteristics
on which they focus cut across many segments of our society." Id., 583 P.2d at 760-61, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 902.
In contrast, a peremptory is exercised on the basis of "group bias" when "a party
presumes that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable
group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds." Id., 583 P.2d at 761,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. When group bias is the basis for a challenge, "the presumed group
bias... is indistinguishable from the group perspectives we seek to encourage by the cross-
section rule." Id.
56. The court borrowed from proposals made by J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 166-67;
Note, supra note 47, at 1733-41. It relied most heavily on the Note in creating its remedy.
Although Article 1, § 16 of the California Constitution, part of a Declaration of Rights,
could have been read as protecting only defendants and not the state, the court ignored this
and boldly stated that all parties would receive protection from the Wheeler ruling.
In People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978), a
companion case to Wheeler, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to eliminate black
veniremen, arguing that the testimony of several state witnesses could arouse hostility in
black jurors. The court held such an assumption insufficient if not based on an individual-
ized voir dire. In a similar decision, the court overruled a superior court's finding that de-
fendants had failed to establish a prima facie case, holding that a pattern of eliminating
black jurors after only a cursory voir dire violated Wheeler. People v. Allen, 23 Cal. 3d 286,
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Unlike Swain, the California decision permits a party to claim
abuse based solely on evidence about the opponent's challenges in the
case at hand; he need not show a pattern of abuse over a period of time.
If the trial court determines that a party has made a satisfactory show-
ing of abuse, the burden shifts to the other party to show that the chal-
lenges were exercised on grounds of specific, rather than group, bias.
The trial judge has complete discretion to determine whether a party
has made a prima facie showing of abuse, and whether the asserted
justifications are adequate. If the striking party fails to justify the ques-
tioned challenges, the court must dismiss the selected jurors and the
remaining veniremen. In this situation, a new venire must be drawn
and a new petit jury must be selected.57
In reaching its conclusion the California Supreme Court relied
upon the United States Supreme Court's decisions striking down exclu-
sion of racial and other groups in the formulation of jury pools58 and
on state cases holding that a fair jury trial requires a verdict by impar-
tial and unprejudiced jurors.5 9 Although the California court assumed
that the Supreme Court would reaffirm Swain,6° the court opted for
what it viewed as more protection for California residents. 6'
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a virtually
identical approach to peremptories in Commonwealth v. Soares.62 The
state charged three defendants with first degree murder in connection
with an early morning street brawl. The incident arose after Harvard
College football players "broke training" when they consumed alco-
holic beverages at a dinner and went to a bar in Boston's "Combat
Zone." As some of the players, apparently none of whom was black,
were heading toward a van to go home, they encountered two black
women and discussed "sexual favors." The two women departed. One
590 P.2d 30, 152 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1979). In Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d
595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979) the court found that ex-felons and resident aliens were not
"cognizable groups" deserving constitutional protection under Wheeler. A cognizable group
was defined as one whose members share a common outlook which arises from group expe-
rience, and whose attitudes cannot be adequately represented by others. Id. at 98, 593 P.2d
at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
57. 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. One author suggests that, as
an additional deterrent against unlawful conduct, an offending party should forfeit some or
all of its challenges in the selection of the new jury. Note, supra note 47, at 1740.
58. See cases cited supra notes 43-45.
59. See, e.g., People v. Carmichael, 198 Cal. 534, 547, 246 P. 62, 67 (1926); People v.
Helm, 152 Cal. 532, 536, 93 P. 99, 101 (1907), disapproved on other grounds, People v. Ed-
wards, 163 Cal. 752, 756, 127 P. 58, 59 (1912).
60. 22 Cal. 3d at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
61. Id.
62. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). Each of three
defendants in Soares had 16 challenges. The prosecutor had 48, but exercised only 44.
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of the players then found that his wallet was missing and unsuccess-
fully chased them. Later, the players saw one of the women, pursued,
and held her as she screamed and attempted to flee. The defendants,
all black, interceded at some point. A fight ensued and one of the play-
ers was killed.
The prosecutor challenged twelve of thirteen black jurors. The
thirteenth was seated and designated the jury foreman. The prosecutor
challenged thirty-two of ninety-four white jurors. As in Wheeler, the
defendants carefully laid a foundation for appeal, noting each time the
prosecution challenged a prospective black juror. The prosecutor indi-
cated no desire to explain the theory behind his strikes and the trial
judge took the position that no explanation was required.
Relying on the state Declaration of Rights, the Massachusetts
court condemned the use of peremptories to exclude discrete groups of
jurors, "solely on the basis of bias presumed to derive from that indi-
vidual's membership in the group."63 Unlike the Wheeler decision,
Soares specified the group affiliations that were impermissible grounds
for exclusion: sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.' The court
adopted the Wheeler procedure for challenging a party's use of per-
emptories as well as the remedy to be applied upon a finding of
abuse.6" Soares, like Wheeler, also held that both prosecutor and de-
fendant were entitled to protest the improper exercise of challenges by
the opposing side.
The court refrained from deciding whether Taylor undermined
Swain and relied on the state constitution as its ultimate authority.66
However, the court quoted from a dissenting United States Supreme
Court opinion in a civil case, borrowing language about the "assurance
of a diffused impartiality,"67 and concluded that the cross-section of the
community requirement could not be limited to selection of jury pools
but must also serve to limit peremptory challenges in order to assure
63. Id. at 488, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
64. Id. The Wheeler court had declined to define the "cognizable groups" whose exclu-
sion would be unlawful because the blacks who were challenged in that case clearly fit
within the category of a "cognizable group." 22 Cal. 3d at 280 n.26, 583 P.2d at 764 n.26,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 n.26.
65. Soares relied very heavily on Wheeler, observing at one point that the California
decision "has broken much of the ground for us." 377 Mass. at 477 n. 12, 387 N.E.2d at 510
n.12.
66. As in Wheeler, the state constitution appeared to protect only the defendant, but the
court found that both sides were entitled to a cross-section of the jury. Id. at 489 n.35, 387
N.E.2d at 517 n.35.
67. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
quoted in 377 Mass. at 480, 387 N.E.2d at 512.
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"diffused impartiality" in trial juries.6"
Like the Wheeler court, the Soares court rejected the argument
that peremptories could be exercised on the basis of group characteris-
tics, simply because "members of specific identified groups in the com-
munity are statistically more likely than the population at large to hold
a given view which might bear on their deliberations in the case."69 It
responded that
[i]t is this very diversity of opinion among individuals, some of
whose concepts may well have been influenced by their group affil-
iations, which is envisioned when we refer to "diffused impartial-
ity." No human being is wholly free of the interests and
preferences which are the product of his cultural, family, and com-
munity experience. Nowhere is the dynamic commingling of the
ideas and biases of such individuals more essential than inside the
jury room.7 °
Soares makes it clear that no individual defendant is entitled to a petit
jury proportionally representing every group in the community, but it
restricts the use of designated group affiliations or identifications as
grounds for striking jurors.7 '
68. In the process the Massachusetts court misstated the holding in one important prece-
dent, referring to Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), as reversing a conviction on constitu-
tional grounds. 377 Mass. at 480, 387 N.E.2d at 512. In fact, there was only a plurality for
the constitutional holding.
The court also suggested, probably mistakenly, that Swain was internally inconsis-
tent: "clearly. . .the Swain decision recognized that the improper use of peremptory chal-
lenges could be controlled by the judge." Id. (emphasis in original). The court actually said
that it was leaving open the question whether systematic and total exclusion of blacks might
be held unconstitutional. Even an affirmative answer would not have resulted in control of
the exercise of peremptories in particular cases.
69. 377 Mass. at 486, 387 N.E.2d at 515.
70. Id. at 486-87, 387 N.E.2d at 515.
71. Although most cases after Soares involved exclusion of black jurors, Common-
wealth v. Whitehead, 400 N.E.2d 821 (Mass. 1980), involved allegations that women were
improperly struck, not by the prosecution, but by a codefendant. Two female defendants
were charged with the rape of another woman. One used eight of ten challenges to strike
women, leaving only males to comprise the jury. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court rejected the other woman's challenge because she had not complained at trial about a
strategy that would have given her "the same supposed advantage" as her codefendant. Id.
at 828. Soares had not been decided at the time of trial, however, and thus the failure to
complain might have been understandable. Moreover, it is unclear how the court that
decided Soares could be satisfied by saying that there was a "supposed advantage" in using
group classifications, because Soares rejects the idea that sexual stereotypes are accurate
predictors of bias. 377 Mass. at 485 n.28, 387 N.E.2d at 514 n.28.
Commonwealth v. Reid, 424 N.E.2d 495 (Mass. 1981), held that the trial judge has
authority to prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to exclude a group of males from a
jury. The court rejected the claim that because the defendant had insufficient challenges to
exclude all males, Soares did not apply. The court said that as long as the purpose for
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It is too early to tell exactly how many state courts will abandon
Swain in favor of the approach developed in California and Massachu-
setts. Some courts have rejected the approach,72 some have reserved
judgment, 3 and some have indicated movement toward adopting it.74
For the most part commentators have reacted favorably. 75 Wheeler
and Soares certainly provide an impetus for change, and for significant
change at that.
These decisions differ from Swain in several important respects.
First, they assume that the peremptory challenge is intended to be used
only to eliminate specific bias from the jury. This assumption signals a
significant departure from the traditional understanding of the chal-
lenge as one exercised for any reason or for no reason. Second, they
assume that a jury from which some ranges of presumed bias have been
excluded is no longer impartial, while Swain assumed that permitting
unrestricted peremptory challenges furthered impartiality. Third, they
presume that the peremptory challenge can be subject to judicial con-
trol without compromising its essential purpose - a proposition that
Swain rejected.
IV. IMPARTIAL POOLS AND IMPARTIAL JURIES
A. Impartiality
The sixth amendment guarantees "an impartial jury."7 6 Most of
the Supreme Court's opportunities to analyze the meaning of "impar-
tial" have involved pretrial publicity cases. In Irvin v. Dowd,77 for ex-
ample, the Court observed that "[i]n essence, the right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial,
challenging males was impermissible, it did not matter that 100% could not be eliminated.
Id. at 500 n.14.
72. See, e.g., People v. Lavinder, 430 N.E. 2d 243 (1981); State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410,
591 P.2d 166 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980); Common-
wealth v. Henderson, 438 A.2d 951 (Pa. 1981); State v. Thompson, 281 S.E.2d 216 (S.C.
1981).
73. See, e.g., Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980); People v. Smith, 622 P.2d 90
(Colo. App. 1980).
74. See State v. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (La. 1979) (Dennis, J., concurring); People
v. Boone, 433 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. 1980); People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 420
N,Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
75. See supra note 8.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Cases like Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), and
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), which bar a state from excluding for cause
jurors who have scruples against the death penalty, indicate that the government may not
stack the deck against a defendant by using cause challenges to systematically exclude per-
sons whose views are less favorable to the government than to the defense.
77. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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'indifferent' jurors."7 It quoted the following from an earlier opinion:
"'[the theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion
cannot be impartial,' ",7 but went on to distinguish between jurors who
have some preconceived notion or information about a case that they
can set aside and jurors who would remain partial after they are im-
panelled. 0 A juror with "a positive and decided opinion"'" should be
disqualified even if the opinion has not been expressed to another. In a
more recent case, Murphy v. Florida,8 2 the Court referred to an imper-
missible juror attitude as "a partiality that could not be laid aside."83
The question raised by Wheeler and Soares is whether the rules articu-
lated in those cases are necessary to guarantee impartiality or whether
they actually detract from it.
The Supreme Court has used the word "indifferent" as a synonym
for "impartial."84 Thus, a criminal defendant should be assured that
no juror prefers a judgment for the state to one for the defendant; 5 a
juror must stand indifferent between the parties. Although the sixth
amendment protects only the defendant, there is nothing in its lan-
guage, and certainly nothing in its history, to suggest that the state may
not protect itself from jurors who are partial to the defense. The
amendment assures that even if the state is willing to tolerate biased
jurors, the defendant need not. Historically, biased jurors could be ex-
cused for cause by either side. The peremptory challenge permits both
sides to strike at hidden, subtle, or subconscious biases that may be just
as threatening as overt prejudice to the concept of an indifferent, and
therefore impartial, jury.
The peremptory also permits parties to strike jurors who seem in-
capable of working together in the collegial process of returning a ver-
dict. Unlike a political process in which participants vote and the side
with the most votes wins, jury deliberations may have to produce unan-
imous or nearly unanimous verdicts.8 6 This is not to say that juries
must always agree, only that they must try to reach a consensus. Some
78. Id. at 722. The word "indifferent" had roots in English law. Id. at 721-22.
79. 366 U.S. at 722 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878)).
80. 366 U.S. at 722-23.
81. Id. at 723.
82. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
83. Id. at 800.
84. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961).
85. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof imposed on prosecutors signi-
fies that risks of error will be borne predominantly by the state, but the risks are to be borne
in a system in which the jurors are fair to both sides.
86. After Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972), and Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), it appears that the jury must be unani-
mous in federal court, splits of as much as 9-3 will be allowed in state courts, and a
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prospective jurors may have great difficulty in working with others.
They may be impartial as far as the parties are concerned, but quite
partial towards other jurors. The peremptory permits the parties to se-
lect juries keeping in mind that a jury eventually will function as a
group.
B. Guarantees of Impartiality
Aside from the peremptory challenge there are two guarantees of
impartiality in the jury selection process: random selection and chal-
lenges for cause.87 Random selection cannot insure an impartial jury
in any particular case because it cannot screen out those jurors who
have some relationship with or bias toward the particular case on trial
or its participants. Jurors who have already made up their minds are as
likely to be swept into the pool as those who are indifferent. Further-
more, random selection may produce particular venires that are com-
prised of only a narrow section of the community.88 Although random
selection may be a necessary condition for an impartial jury, it is not a
sufficient one.
The challenge for cause also is inadequate to protect against the
bias that may exist in a randomly selected jury venire. The statutory
grounds for challenge are usually drafted and applied quite narrowly,
and a juror will seldom be removed for cause unless prejudice is admit-
ted or clearly implied. Denials of bias are not reliable for several rea-
sons: first, jurors are embarrassed to admit their prejudices when
questioned before a large group;89 second, it is common for certain ve-
niremen to decide that they want to be on the jury and then to evade
questions - often unconsciously - in order to avoid being struck;9°
third, jurors often are unaware of the existence or extent of their
biases.9'
Even when bias can be inferred from a juror's answers on voir
nonunanimous six person jury is unconstitutional everywhere. See generaly Jacobsohn, The
Unanimous Verdict: Politics and the Jury Trial, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 39.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 12-25.
88. In other words, the odds are that some juries will be less proportionate than others as
a number of juries are selected. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH
TO EVIDENCE 205 n.49 (1977).
89. See supra note 13,
90. Babcock, supra note 13, at 547; Broeder, Voir Dire Examinatio:An Empirical Study,
38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 510-11 (1965); Suggs & Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire.-
4 Social Science Analysir, 56 IND. L.J. 245 (1981) (explaining why jurors may be reluctant to
confess biases).
91. "(Unconscious] bias arises most often from lingering effects of pretrial publicity or
from socioeconomic influences, including racial and ethnic background. In our heterogene-
ous society, socioeconomic factors are especially likely to create powerful prejudices, even
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dire, a judge may be reluctant to remove the juror if he asserts his abil-
ity to be fair. One commentator has argued that judicial restraint may
be proper in this context.92 The detection of subconscious bias is too
intuitive and subjective to justify a judicial pronouncement that a juror
is unable to render an impartial judgment.93 Thus, peremptories serve
an essential function because they permit the parties to exercise judg-
ments on the basis of characteristics which would be "societally divi-
sive" for judges to recognize as valid challenges for cause:
Common human experience, common sense, psychosociological
studies, and public opinion polls tell us that it is likely that certain
classes of people statisticaly have predispositions that would make
them inappropriate jurors for particular kinds of cases. But to al-
low this knowledge to be expressed in the evaluative terms neces-
sary for challenges for cause would undercut our desire for a
society in which all people are judged as individuals and in which
each is held reasonable and open to compromise. 94
Peremptory challenges serve to remove those jurors whose neutral-
ity parties suspect, when the parties cannot prove partiality ith
enough certainty to justify a challenge for cause.9" In addition, they
protect the exercise of the challenge for cause by allowing a party to
remove a juror whom he has alienated through extensive voir dire
aimed at identifying possible biases. The peremptory also seeks to in-
sure that a party has a good opinion of the jury by allowing him to
remove anyone he intuitively dislikes.96 Thus, not only impartiality,
but also the appearance of impartiality, is an important goal of the ex-
though the holder may be unaware of their influence." Note, supra note 13, at 1496 (foot-
notes omitted).
Other jurors . . underestimate the impact of their biases on their ability to
weigh the evidence. This phenomenon is especially likely to occur in cases of group
bias where the individual juror may have no inkling that his views are not shared by
others outside his own group or that his attitudes so profoundly color his perceptions
that he may be incapable of accepting testimony with an open mind.
Babcock, supra note 13, at 554.
Justice Black noted that "[t]he test of bias sufficient to exclude a juror for cause is not
what the particular juror believes he could do." Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 176
(1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
92. Note, supra note 13, at 1500.
93. Id.
94. Babcock, supra note 13, at 553 (footnote omitted).
95. Professor Babcock writes that the peremptory "avoids trafficking in the core truth in
most common stereotypes." Id. Through the peremptory, "the judicial system lets the par-
ties handle under the guise of silence and caprice what the courts themselves should not and
perhaps cannot handle rationally and explicitly." Note, supra note 13, at 1503.
96. See supra note 20.
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ercise of peremptories.97 And the peremptory may serve to reduce the
extent of the bias that imperfect selection schemes may produce.98 For
example, the few studies that have been conducted indicate that juries
"selected" by the parties are less likely to convict than those that are
randomly selected after challenges for cause.99
In conclusion, it appears that the peremptory challenge is more
than just a traditional statutory right that may be helpful in obtaining a
fair jury. The inadequacies of random selection and challenges for
cause strongly suggest that the peremptory challenge is essential to the
impartial jury right.
C. Impartiality v. Cross-Section
Striking jurors removes some community voices from juries,
thereby raising doubts whether juries adequately represent the full
spectrum of community opinion. There is a problem, however, with
any argument that the sixth amendment requires that the full spectrum
of opinion be available on all juries. Such an argument would allow
veniremen with strong and obvious biases toward or against a party to
be seated on a jury merely because they represent a part of the commu-
nity. It is these jurors, of course, that are removed for cause; by defini-
tion they are partial. Although the present system permits peremptory
strikes of additional community voices, it does so because the challenge
for cause cannot adequately eliminate all partiality. There is a danger
in permitting peremptories, however. Parties may strike truly impartial
97. Obviously, this argument can cut both ways: Just as the use of peremptories to ob-
tain a partial jury would defeat its purpose, so too its use to create an apparently partial jury
might also be considered "abuse." The argument has been made that the use of challenges
to remove all the minorities from a jury, particularly when the defendant is a member of that
minority, deprives the jury of its legitimacy in the eyes of both the defendant and his com-
munity - whether or not the body could be considered impartial in the abstract. See Kuhn,
supra note 17, at 246-47.
98. Clearly, peremptory challenges will not always assure the appearance of fairness. If,
for example, a randomly selected venire represents only a narrow section of the community,
peremptory challenges may further limit community representation on the jury. In some
instances we would urge that additional jurors be summoned or that a particular draw be set
aside and a new selection of jurors be attempted.
99. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 23, at 518-19. Professors Zeisel and Diamond used
shadow juries composed of challenged jurors to conduct a comparative study of the verdicts
of randomly selected and actual juries in twelve criminal cases. In all five cases in which the
use of the peremptory challenge caused significant shifts in voting, the defendant was the
beneficiary. The authors suggested that the defense attorneys out-performed the prosecutors
in challenging the "right" people - i.e., jurors who actually voted against them, and that the
defendant often had more challenges. Although the study was too small to render conclu-
sive results, it does suggest that the peremptory, in practice, can provide the defendant with
special protection. See also Diamond & Zeisel, A Courtroom Experiment on Juror Selection
and Decision-Making, 1 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 276 (1974).
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jurors because they are somehow different from the parties or from
most other jurors. Certain segments of the population thus may not
participate on a jury. It may be difficult'to distinguish bias, which the
jury system wishes to eliminate, from cultural diversity which the cross-
section requirement seeks to preserve.
Several different proposals for promoting impartiality have been
prompted by the recognition that jurors with different backgrounds
may have different values. The first is that the jury be composed solely
of the defendant's peers.' °° This system would insure that the jurors
would interpret the evidence within the context in which the crime oc-
curred. Also, jurors would apply the values of the defendant's commu-
nity in ascertaining guilt or innocence. This proposal has gained little
acceptance for several reasons. The community of the victim - and
the people at large - have a strong interest in seeing that justice is
done. Also, it is often difficult to isolate the relevant socioeconomic
factors that must be matched in order to produce a jury of one's
"peers." Furthermore, the democratic ethic in this country maintains
that all citizens are peers, thus denying the existence of class distinc-
tions.10' Finally, in some cases, the defendant's community members
may not be neutral when the government opposes their "peer."
A second proposal is the "mixed jury," combining peers of both
the victim with those of the defendant. While having some historical
basis," 2 this model also has been rejected for many of the same reasons
as the first. The administrative problems of identifying applicable
groups are too great. There is reluctance to recognize officially that the
inclusion of certain groups on a jury may affect the verdict. Also, once
again the identification of jurors with participants may suggest partial-
ity or favoritism, not neutrality or indifference. Finally, the extremes
such a jury would present threaten the prospects of the jury's reaching
a verdict.
The third proposal is that the jury consist of a representative cross-
section of the community. The assumption underlying this model is
that the interplay of diverse views and experiences yields a verdict that
represents the conscience of the community as a whole, which is less
likely to be based on any one set of prejudices. Although the Supreme
100. Note, The Casefor Black Juries, 79 YALE L. 531 (1970).
101. Potash, Mandatory Inclusion of Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 BLACK L.J. 80, 92
(1973).
102. In England, theyury de meditaten linguae, or jury of the half tongue, was used until
1870 to insure aliens a fair trial. It was composed half of local residents and half of aliens.
In Canada, an alien is entitled to a jury at least half of which is skilled in his own language.
Id. at 93.
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Court has recognized the importance of selecting a juryfrom a cross-
section of the population,10 3 it has refused to hold that the petit jury
itself must reflect such a representation,' °4 A few commentators have
proposed mandatory representation of certain distinct groups on the
petit jury, 10 5 but the majority have argued merely that the jury should
be as representative of the community as the process of random draw
will permit after challenges for cause.106
In contrast to these recent proposals, the traditional model for jury
selection assumes that impartiality is best realized by first choosing a
pool of jurors from the community at large, excusing those clearly bi-
ased, and then permitting the parties to excuse additional jurors who,
in their view, are less likely than others to provide a fair trial. This is
not a perfect system for eliminating bias. Jurors still may have some
residual sympathy for one side or the other. This system of selection
eliminates those jurors each side distrusts most and leaves a remaining
group that is preferred by each side, at least when compared with the
jurors each party struck.
Neither Wheeler nor Soares rejects the last model of jury selection.
Both decisions recognize the need for peremptory challenges as an ad-
ditional protection against partiality. Both decisions accept that the
process of removing partial jurors may cut down on the number of dif-
ferent community voices that will be heard on a jury, but both appar-
ently conclude that impartiality is the principal concern of the sixth
amendment in selecting a particular jury in a particular case. In other
words, both cases accept the proposition that a jurisdiction must choose
a jury that is in fact impartial. If the exclusion of biased jurors elimi-
nates some portions of the community, that is acceptable because the
cross-section that should serve on a jury is a cross-section of fair - i.e.,
impartial - jurors. Wheeler and Soares maintain, however, that the
exercise of challenges on the grounds of group bias is improper because
these challenges are insufficiently attuned to eliminating bias and thus
eliminate too many of the community's different voices.
D. The Importance of Groups
The Supreme Court's jury cases have made the point that exclud-
ing groups from the pool may result in a skewing of community senti-
ment."0 7 But this point is different from that made in Wheeler and
103. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-28 (1975). See also supra note 44.
104. See supra note 47.
105. Potash, supra note 101, at 94.
106. See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 167-69; Note, supra note 47, at 1732.
107. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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Soares. If the state were free to exclude various groups that it views as
more likely to be favorable to defendants when the jury pool is being
selected, these groups might not have any opportunity to be part of the
jury process.' 08 This exclusion would create suspicion that the state
was trying to exclude absolutely those groups that might view the world
differently than the group responsible for enacting and implementing
jury selection schemes.
An example can illustrate this point. If a prosecutor or a court
clerk acting at the prosecutor's request summons a jury venire of per-
sons known to be friendly to the prosecutor, no system of peremptory
challenges is likely to produce an impartial jury. If, however, selection
is random, there is no reason to think that the jury pool is not as impar-
tial to begin with as is the community at large.
Wheeler and Soares leap from the jury pool selection requirements
to the conclusion that parties should not select a particular jury using
race and other group classifications as the basis for peremptory chal-
lenges. In making the leap they ignore the different interests at stake
when the criminal justice system summons jurors to form a pool and
when parties select individual jurors for a particular case. Those sum-
moning jurors want a pool that can provide fair jurors for all cases and
all parties. Parties, on the other hand, are faced with a particular case,
specific evidence, and a designated group of jurors from which to pick.
They want individual jurors who will be fair to them and thus they seek
a proxy, whether race or something else, that relates to the specifics of
their case. The proxy must be helpful in identifying partiality, not gen-
erally, but in a very specific context.
Wheeler and Soares seem to say that some group classifications
never are acceptable proxies but they fail to explain why. Whatever it
is about group associations that suggests that members of one group are
somehow different from non-members also suggests that any differ-
ences might include a greater likelihood of certain shared feelings,
which might imply partiality in some instances. If so, a challenge
would be made to all members of the group precisely because they
share special feelings.
E. The Identiftcation of Bias
In an ideal world, all jurors would be aware of their biases and
would admit to them readily on voir dire. In reality, some of the
108. This possibility prompted Justice White to leave open in Swain the question whether
total exclusion of a racial group would be unconstitutional. 380 U.S. 202, 222-24 (1965). See
also supra note 76.
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strongest prejudices are subconscious, and even if jurors are aware of
their existence, they might be reluctant to admit them. Thus, parties
must find some other way to discover hidden predispositions. Sug-
gested methods include extensive voir dire examination, 0 9 hypnoanal-
ysis,'i 0 investigation of jurors,' scientific jury selection,' 12 and the
traditional method - reliance on stereotypes that experience indicates
are accurate.
Voir dire questioning educates counsel about prospective jurors
and allows him to challenge jurors without relying solely on stereo-
types. Obviously, both the content and delivery of responses produce
valuable information on which to base a judgment that a juror is or is
not impartial. However, the method is far from ideal. Extensive voir
dire questioning is time-consuming and costly. Given the backlog of
cases in many courts, judges often are reluctant to allow the type of
examination necessary to elicit helpful information. Furthermore, the
trend toward giving judges discretion to control the length and nature
of voir dire questioning reflects the prevalent judicial and legislative
judgment that the costs of extensive voir dire outweigh the benefits.' 13
Thus, as a practical matter, this option is not available in many cases.
Also, as a matter of policy, it may be undesirable to subject prospective
jurors to interrogation in a public forum about their political or per-
sonal views. Forcing jurors to disclose embarrassing information or
unpopular views - often in open court, with both fellow veniremen
and the press in attendance - may create hostility both toward the
parties involved and the system in general. 14 The importance of iden-
tifying juror biases and the availability of other methods for doing so
must be balanced against serious invasions of privacy and the danger
of alienating the public from the judicial system.
A second technique for identifying bias is called hypnoanalysis. It
involves the use of a psychologist to study the background of jurors, the
content of their responses on voir dire, their intonations, body move-
ments, and interaction with counsel to determine subconscious
109. See generally Babcock, supra note 13; Note, supra note 13.
110. Seegenerally W. BRYAN, THE CHOSEN ONES (1971).
111. See A. GINGER, supra note 13, §§ 8.1-.14.
112. See generally NAT'L JURY PROJECT & NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, THE JURY SYSTEM
33-35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L JURY PROJECT]; Frederick, Jury Behavior: .A Psy-
chologist Examines Jury Selection, 5 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 571 (1978).
113. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 15-2.4 commentary at 24
(1978).
114. The jury foreperson for the Angela Davis trial has argued that jurors have a right to
be free from investigation into their private lives, including freedom from public voir dire
questioning and from advance investigations of friends and neighbors of prospective jurors.
M. TIMOTHY, JURY WOMAN 306 (1974).
19821
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
prejudices." 5 While this method has been used with apparent success
in a few highly publicized murder trials," 6 it is too expensive for the
vast majority of defendants even to consider. Further, its success de-
pends on the availability of extensive voir dire - something a judge is
more likely to grant in a highly publicized case than in the average
criminal prosecution. Finally, the technique seeks not only to identify
and remove biased jurors but also to condition neutral or friendly pro-
spective jurors so as to make them more responsive to one party's evi-
dence at trial. This conditioning raises important policy questions
about the difference between jury selection and "jury-tampering."
Whatever the propriety of this method, it is clearly not a helpful means
of discovering bias in the vast majority of cases.
A third technique for identifying prejudice is pretrial investigation
of all prospective jurors - often a few hundred in number. Although
personal contact with jurors is impermissible, a litigant can uncover a
great deal of information by talking to neighbors or fellow employees,
by checking voter registration forms, recent referendum petitions, the
location and general characteristics of a juror's neighborhood and place
of employment, and records of previous jury duty." 7 In some large
cities, private agencies keep files on all jurors currently on duty. The
information available from these sources ideally is used to formulate
the "right" questions for discovering bias on voir dire. In addition, it
provides a composite picture of a particular juror from which to make
an educated guess as to his probable predispositions.
When used in the second manner, this technique is very similar to
scientific jury selection, "1 the fourth method of discovering juror bias.
That method involves a two-step process. Initially, an attempt is made
to correlate the relationship between attitudes and various demo-
graphic characteristics such as race, sex, religion, age, and occupation.
115. See generally W. BRYAN, supra note 110, at 153-69. Hypnoanalysis should not be
confused with hypnosis as that term is commonly understood.
116. Hypnoanalysis was used to choose the juries in the second Sam Sheppard trial and
in the first Coppolino trial in New Jersey, among others. Both of these defendants were
acquitted. See W. BRYAN, supra note 110, at 399-404. See also McConahay, Mullin &
Frederick, The Uses of Social Science in Trials with Political and Racial Overtones: The Trial
ofJoan Little, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (Wint. 1977).
Experts in the area of jury selection generally separate "hypnoanalysis" into 3 areas:
evaluation of personality characteristics and general attitudes, evaluation of nonverbal be-
havior, and persuasion. The division reflects the potentially independent contributions
made by each of these components to careful jury selection. The combination of techniques
is evident in the Joan Little case. See McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, supra. Hypnoanal-
ysis is used in this discussion as a general description of the more sophisticated technique.
117. A. GINGER, supra note 13, §§ 8.1-.14.
118. NAT'L JURY PROJECT, supra note 112, 33-35.
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A survey is sent to a random sample of potential jurors, e.g., registered
voters, asking questions about both the case in question and general
feelings about the administration of justice. The responses can be
quantified to indicate the probability that a juror with particular char-
acteristics will be favorable to one side. In the second step, veniremen
are questioned on voir dire to elicit the same type of demographic in-
formation. A composite score for each juror is obtained by combining
the ratings for each relevant characteristic. The result is specific both to
the community and the case involved. Ideally, this model permits the
accurate prediction of facial or other bias or predispositions about guilt
or innocence without the necessity of intrusive questioning on voir dire.
Both juror investigation and scientific selection can be extremely
expensive and time-consuming. Thus they are most helpful in "big"
cases or highly political trials where either many volunteers or substan-
tial funds are available.
The last alternative for identifying bias is the age-old technique
used by trial lawyers - reliance on experience, intuition, and common
sense to predict which jurors are likely to be most biased. The use of
intuitive "hunches" differs from juror investigation and scientific jury
selection more in degree than in kind. All three techniques attempt,
with various degrees of precision, to gauge the probability that a juror
with particular socioeconomic characteristics will be more biased in a
given case than another juror. All three deal in generalizations and
stereotypes. Even hypnoanalysis, which attempts more directly to dis-
cover a juror's attitudes, in the end relies on generalizations about the
meanings of particular body movements, the choice of words, or the
intonation of the voice.
Swain recognized the necessity of relying on stereotypes to identify
probable bias. Wheeler and Soares, on the other hand, condemned the
practice, holding that the challenge is properly used only to eliminate
"specific bias." However, the distinction between the two is elusive.
For instance, Wheeler cited as examples of lawful exercises of the per-
emptory a prosecutor's removal of a juror who has an arrest record,
who has complained of police harassment, or whose clothes or hair
length indicate an unconventional lifestyle." 9 Wheeler would also al-
low defense counsel to challenge a juror who has been a victim of crime
or who has relatives in law enforcement.' 20 These are specific biases
because they are "neutral with respect to the various groups repre-
sented on the venire: the characteristics on which they focus cut across
119. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 275-76, 583 P.2d at 760-61, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
120. Id.
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many segments of our society."'' However, in all these examples, as
in the use of conventional stereotypes, bias is being presumed from a
juror's membership in a group. When a prosecutor challenges a juror
with an arrest record or long hair, he does so because he considers per-
sons with those characteristics more likely to be biased against law en-
forcement - not because he knows for a fact that this particular juror
is biased. Thus the major difference between the two practices is
merely the definition of the relevant group. It seems unimportant that
one group is defined by demographic characteristics and another by the
choice of lifestyle or the occurrence of some event. In both cases, a
party is trying to eliminate a predisposition in favor of the opposing
side, which he infers from a juror's group membership. Thus, Wheeler
condemned neither the elimination of the attitude itself nor the use of
group membership as a proxy for identifying bias.
It is irrelevant that some of the impermissible groups in Wheeler
are "suspect classifications." The equal protection clause does not in-
validate challenges on the grounds of group bias. 22 Under the law, all
defendants, no matter what race or religion, may challenge jurors they
dislike. Similarly, all jurors are equally subject to challenge by the gov-
ernment. If the government always strikes all jurors of one race, sex, or
other group, it probably violates Swain. But as long as no group is
systematically excluded in all cases, all groups and all members thereof
are treated alike - i.e., all are subject to strikes. While one side strikes
jurors with certain characteristics, the opposite side is likely to strike
jurors with different characteristics. Thus, peremptory challenges do
not demean any single group or deny any person any guaranteed right
to serve, nor do they distribute any benefits to one race, sex, or other
suspect group that are not conferred upon a competing group.
Wheeler does not make the closeness of the fit between a group
and the presumed bias dispositive on the propriety of the presumption.
The assumption that a young black male who lives in a ghetto neigh-
borhood is hostile to the police is probably as statistically supportable
as the assumption that long-haired jurors would favor the defendant -
but Wheeler would permit only the latter. If the Wheeler court had
been concerned primarily with accuracy, then it would not have implic-
itly condemned the use of scientific jury selection - which correlates
121. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
122. The Wheeler court suggested that economic distinctions were impermissible grounds
for the exercise of the challenge. Id. at 267, 583 P.2d at 754-55, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
Economic distinctions constitute a classification that is not "suspect" under the equal protec-
tion clause. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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the attitudes toward a particular case with the demographic groups in a
specific community with a high degree of success.
Furthermore, the accuracy of the stereotype should not determine
the validity of the challenge. Any attempt to make the constitutionality
of a challenge depend on the accuracy of the underlying assumptions
would penalize lower-income defendants who are unable to afford so-
phisticated techniques or expensive expert assistance.1 3 Moreover, if
courts were to try to ensure accuracy they would have to inquire into
racial and other prejudices - an inquiry that they now prefer to avoid.
F. The Internal Check on Misuse of Peremptory Challenges
If one assumes a wide range of types and degrees of bias on a jury
venire, judicial control may be unnecessary to insure that counsel exer-
cise the peremptory as accurately as possible within the limits of avail-
able information. In one sense, the challenge system contains an
internal sanction against abuse: a party who insists on challenging ju-
rors on the basis of questionable stereotypes increases his chances of
removing friendly jurors and decreases his opportunities for excluding
more biased veniremen, thus reducing the possibility of success at trial.
If the assessment of a juror's prejudices based on group affiliation is
accurate, however, then counsel has exercised the challenge as it was
intended - to remove the most partial jurors. 24
There are real opportunity costs, then, in exercising peremptory
challenges for the wrong reasons. Those who strike jurors on grounds
of race or sex or some other classification that is not a very good proxy
for bias miss opportunities for more selective strikes and thus risk hav-
ing a jury that is not as impartial as it might be. This internal control
may explain why litigants have failed to meet the Swain test.' 25 It may
be that, in the real world, prosecutors understand the need to exercise
challenges in light of specific facts, know that they cannot afford to
waste their challenges, and conclude that in most cases race is simply
not a very good predictor of bias.
123. Babcock, supra note 13, at 559-63.
124. There is evidence that stereotypes may be accurate in some cases. See generally
Hepburn, The Objective Reality of Evidence and the Utility of Systematic Jury Selection, 4
J.L. & HuM. BEHAV. 89 (1980).
125. For an example of opportunity costs, see People v. Allen, 23 Cal. 3d 286, 590 P.2d
30, 152 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1979) (prosecutor struck black relatives of sheriffs in a prison guard
murder case).
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V. THE IMPACT OF WHEELER and SOCRES
A. Protection of Minority Interests
The assumption of the cases that bar challenges on the basis of
certain group affiliations is that increased representation of minority
interests will promote fairer trials irrespective of the issues involved in
specific cases. Several examples should show that the resultant trials
are not necessarily fairer and may, in fact, be considerably less fair
when the parties are prevented from striking the jurors they regard as
most likely to be biased.
During the school desegregation troubles in Boston, there was
fighting between whites and blacks. White youths in particular sections
allegedly were involved in several attacks on black youths.126 Assume
they were Irish-American Catholics. 27 If the state charged one of the
attackers with aggravated assault, should a prosecutor be permitted to
strike white Irish-American Catholics from the jury? Soares, and prob-
ably Wheeler, would say "no," unless the prosecutor could prove that
specific jurors were biased in the particular case - i.e., some showing
of individual bias would be necessary. But is there any reason to doubt
that other Irish-American Catholics in the district might tend to be
more partial to a defendant from the same ethnic group than to a pros-
ecutor seeking to vindicate a black victim, especially if the prospective
jurors share a sense of frustration growing out of the desegregation pro-
cess? The example illustrates that a peremptory strike is useful because
it allows a prosecutor to rely on the relationship between a prospective
juror's background and the kind of case being tried. Were the case a
simple bank robbery, a prosecutor might not even think of striking on
this ethnic basis. In the assault case, it might make sense to do so. If
the prosecutor does strike members of this group, the court still should
be able to impanel a broadly based jury. Mormons, Protestants, Jews,
atheists, and black Catholics all would be free of prosecutorial strikes,
as would numerous other groups. Thus, quite a cross-section of the
community would remain.
The facts are changed easily. Other reports out of Boston related
that black youths also were attacking whites.'28 If the state charged a
black defendant with aggravated assault, would a prosecutor who
126. See Boston Globe, Oct. 19, 1979, at 18.
For an illustration of a case in which religion of jurors was thought to be important,
see Schulman, Shaver, Colman, Emrich & Christie, Recioe for a Jury, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
May 1973, at 37.
127. This is an assumption only, although there was some resentment against blacks by
Irish- and Italian-Americans reported at the time. See NEWSWEEK, Oct. 29, 1979, at 59.
128. Boston Globe, Oct. 17, 1979, at 17.
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struck black jurors be exercising good judgment with respect to possi-
ble partiality? Again, the answer probably is "yes." If the prosecutor
did not strike the jurors that he thought might be partial, would the
Irish-American Catholic community believe that a fair trial was being
conducted? Probably not. If the prosecutor did strike blacks, the court
still could impanel a broadly based jury that would almost certainly
include people whose religious beliefs were antithetical to the Catholic
community as well as numerous ethnic groups that may be almost as
distant from the Irish-American community as from the black
community.
For a more general example, consider an interracial rape case, one
in which a black woman accuses a white defendant of rape. Could the
prosecutor justify striking jurors who were members of the Ku Klux
Klan?129 Members of the American Nazi Party? If so, it must be be-
cause the strike makes sense in terms of general beliefs about the kinds
of prejudices and preferences certain people may have. Would the
prosecutor strike black jurors? Almost certainly not. There would be
no reason for him to do so. Would the defense strike black jurors? It
might, but the defense might be more concerned with striking jurors
from the same neighborhood, women, or young jurors who might be
especially sympathetic to the victim and thus more likely to be partial.
Now reverse the facts. A white woman accuses a black defendant.
Would a prosecutor be likely to challenge black jurors? It is more
likely that he would in this case than in the previous one, 130 but it is not
at all certain he would do so. The choice to strike blacks might result
in the presence of young people, liberals, or members of the defend-
ant's community on the jury. The prosecutor pays a price for striking
only one group. And when he focuses on only one group, he permits
all other groups in the community to be represented on the jury, assur-
ing that a broad cross-section remains.
Actually,,in all of these cases there is insufficient information to
support any reliable judgment as to who should be struck and who
passed. The first step in deciding whom to strike would be to examine
129. One court has taken judicial notice that the United Klans of America is a "white
hate" organization. United Klans of Am. v. McGovern, 453 F. Supp. 836, 839 (N.D. Ala.
1978), ajf'd, 621 F.2d 152 (Sth Cir. 1980).
130. There is some evidence that the races of the victim, the defendant, and the jurors
may be significant to the outcome of a case. See Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in
Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. EXPEFIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 133
(1979). A recent example can be found in the series of murders of black children in Atlanta.
A black man was charged in two killings. Atlanta Constitution, June 22, 1981, at I-A. If,
however, the defendant were white, would defense counsel be unreasonable in striking black
jurors?
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the jury array to see what choices are available. Then a judgment
would have to be made by comparing the jurors in the pool to one
another. In some jurisdictions a strike seats a successor juror whose
identity is not known in advance, and any strike involves an extra ele-
ment of risk that may inhibit the use of peremptory strikes. 3 1  This
system may make any strike risky and may dictate a cautious strategy
for exercising strikes.
According to Wheeler and Soares, challenges on racial and certain
other group lines are always impermissible, whether or not the use of
group identification is the best predictor of bias under the circum-
stances. 132 Such a rule will not uniformly protect the interests of mi-
norities. It is unclear which groups may suffer in particular cases,
because a single case may involve more than one minority or group -
e.g., Irish-American Catholics and blacks; or blacks and women.1
33
B. Establishing Individual Bias
One of the unfortunate outgrowths of the two recent decisions is
that they may produce voir dire tactics that are inflammatory or decep-
tive. 134 If one party believes that race, sex, or another group character-
istic is a good proxy in a particular case, he may suggest that in voir
dire of the jury. He may then challenge for cause any prospective ju-
rors from the groups about which he is concerned who agree with his
suggestion. Jurors who disagree might reasonably feel insulted by the
131. See supra note 20.
132. It is difficult to know exactly how important race is in any particular case. See Fred-
erick, supra note 112, at 574. Race may be a good predictor of attitudes, but it may not
always predict outcomes accurately. See Hepburn, supra note 124, at 95.
133. As minority populations increase in some places, see generally Feinberg, Four Large
Cities Pass District in Black-Population Percentage, Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1979, at C-l, it may
be white defendants who express concern about exclusion of whites from juries. Suppos-
edly, two Supreme Court Justices already are concerned. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARM-
STRONG, THE BRETHREN 324 (1979). In Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449 (D.C. 1981),
the court said that where 70% of the population is black and the jury pool was fairly chosen,
there was no constitutional infirmity in the prosecution's striking white males from the jury
panel in a case in which a white defendant was charged with the rape and murder of a black
woman.
134. Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, 427 N.E.2d 754, 757 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), indicates
that counsel will have to learn to hide their reasons for strikes and to be quick to suggest
"legitimate" reasons to satisfy some trial judges. In that case defendants were charged with
a series of offenses involving theft and illegal use of firearms. They tried to strike the only
black juror on the venire, but the prosecution objected. When the trial judge asked counsel
to explain the strike, counsel first said that he was striking the juror because she was a widow
and later added that he did not like the way the juror "looks at the defendant." Although
the trial judge found that the reasons were "credible" ones, he found them "insufficient."
Even without a pattern of strikes, the appellate tribunal found that the trial judge acted
properly.
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suggestion and respond in a way that would cause them to be excluded
peremptorily as hostile on an individualized basis. The result may be
increased hostility between prospective jurors and litigants.
The decisions also may lead to greater scrutiny of juror attitudes
and values. If a court is going to bar all strikes of members of certain
groups without a showing of individualized cause, it will be natural for
parties who believe that the group characteristic is a good proxy to ask
for an opportunity to prove that it works well. 35 Aside from infringing
on the privacy of prospective jurors, the inquiry itself is likely to be-
come hostile and to justify the use of a peremptory challenge.
It is doubtful then that Wheeler and Soares will provide increased
minority representation on juries. As noted above, it is even possible
that the decisions will increase tensions along racial and other lines by
encouraging a detailed inquiry into the hidden thoughts of prospective
jurors and by forcing parties to challenge jurors more directly than they
must at present. Or, it may result in attempts to use voir dire to create
alternative theories for striking jurors of a particular group without re-
vealing that group membership is the real reason for strikes. Should
this occur, voir dire is likely to become more time-consuming, more
deceptive, and no more protective of minority interests than the Swain
system.
C. Minority Impact on Verdicts
Several arguments may establish that representation of minorities
on juries is desirable, particularly when the defendant is also a member
of a minority group, but none supports a constitutional rule that chal-
lenges cannot be used to remove those jurors.
Minority jurors may be helpful in interpreting events in the con-
text in which they occurred. They may understand, for instance, that a
black youth might run from the police without his action being proba-
tive of guilt of any crime.' 36 However, other methods are available for
conveying this information to the jury, such as the use of a "streetper-
son" as an expert witness. 13 1 Or, the trial judge may exclude the evi-
dence of a defendant's flight from the police on the ground that it is
135. See Babcock, supra note 13, at 558.
136. For a discussion of the importance of jurors' experience with police, see generally
MINIMIZING RACISM IN JuRy TaiALs (A. Ginger ed. 1969). Of course, this is also stereotyp-
ing. Would a wealthy black doctor be as useful here as a white inner city youth?
137. Such a person would qualify as an expert under rules like FED. R. EvID. 702. See,
ag., United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1978) (experience with
marijuana).
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more prejudicial than probative. 138 Thus, while such jurors are helpful,
they are not necessary. If counsel suspects them of bias, he should be
permitted to strike them.
Minority participation in the administration of justice also creates
respect for the system and contributes to the legitimacy of the result.
Although this consideration justifies the constitutional requirement that
blacks not be systematically excluded from juries, it cannot take prece-
dence over the need for impartiality in any particular case.
A final argument against using peremptories to exclude identifi-
able groups from a jury is that the practice affects verdicts. Studies
have shown that increasing the number of blacks or women in the jury
pool can have a significant impact on conviction rates.' 39 These studies
hardly are surprising, because they deal with systems in which large
segments of the community never were allowed to serve on juries. We
have already noted that wholesale exclusion of groups may indicate
that a pool is stacked in favor of the government. It is possible to infer
that the representation of identifiable groups on a petit jury also would
affect the outcome and thus should be constitutionally required. How-
ever, there are problems with relying on legal and psychological studies
about jury behavior in particular cases as a basis for constitutional
decisionmaking.
First, the results reached by these studies are inconclusive and con-
tradictory. For instance, studies have shown that blacks and women
sometimes favor defendants;" that a defendant's race has no effect on
verdicts;' 4 ' that women are more punitive than men; 142 that white ju-
rors are more lenient toward black defendants accused of crimes
against black victims; 143 that jurors of higher economic status or educa-
tional level are more likely to convict; 44 that the greater the socioeco-
nomic disparity between the defendant and the jury, the more likely it
is to convict; 145 that authorititarian personalities convict more often
than egalitarian - except in rape cases;" and that Irish, Italians,
Catholics, and Jews are more sympathetic to the defense than
138. Some courts are clearly suspicious of evidence of flight from authority. See, e.g.,
United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d'1036, 1048-50 (5th Cir. 1977).
139. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 24-42.
140. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 109-11 (1967).
141. Nemeth & Sosis, A Simulated Jury Study. Characteristics of the Defendant and the
Jurors, 90 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 221, 227-28 (1973).
142. Kuhn, supra note 17, at 248 n.57. See also A. GINGER, Supra note 13, § 7.39.
143. Frederick, supra note 112, at 574-75.
144. Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting, and Verdict Trends, 65 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 361 (1965).
145. Adler, Socioeconomic Factors Influencing Jury Verdicts, 3 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1, 4 (1973).
146. Frederick, supra note 112, at 582.
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Germans, Englishmen, Scandinavians, and Baptists. 147
Second, reliance on such studies necessarily affects the operative
assumptions of our legal system. At present, the law presumes that in
finding facts, individual jurors will make like inferences and reach like
conclusions in like situations, no matter who the parties are. 148 Com-
mentators have argued that when one group in the population is
prejudiced against another and the latter is in the minority, any attempt
to remove a minority juror increases the bias of the jury rather than
making it more impartial. 149 The controlling presumption here is that
the system is divided into a majority and a minority that are in com-
plete conflict with each other, and that there can be no overlap between
the attitudes and biases of either group. Thus the removal of a black
juror may eliminate one biased juror, but it also results in replacement
with a white - and thus reciprocally biased - individual.
Although it is unquestionably true that this substitution may occur
on occasion, it is not clear that the presumption of majority-minority
conflict is a desirable basis for a constitutional standard for jury selec-
tion. If this presumption were adopted, the working hypothesis would
be that majority and minority interests are so hostile to one another
that replacement of a minority juror with a majority juror is unfair.
Under this hypothesis, however, it is difficult to see how any jury panel
could be established that would be composed of jurors indifferent to
the parties. By definition each juror would favor one party, and there
could be no jury that would qualify as impartial. This hypothesis also
ignores the existence of numerous overlapping minority groups. A
young, Catholic, black woman whose political beliefs are liberal, whose
income is high and who works in a professional occupation could be
classified in many ways. It may be a mistake to treat her as black, as a
woman, as a professional, or as a member of any one group to the
exclusion of others.
Another presumption about the operation of the system that is at
least equally tenable is that there is a wide spectrum of attitudes and
biases that cuts across racial or economic groups. Some considerable
overlap may be due to such other relevant factors as religion, occupa-
tion, sex, and education level. As a result, a young, liberal, white juror
may be more friendly to a young, aggressive, black, male defendant
than would an older, black, male juror who has worked continuously
for white employers.
147. F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 198 (1959) (quoting Clarence Dar-
row); I. GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE 156 (1935); Frederick, supra note 112, at 574.
148. MINIMIZING RACISM IN JURY TRIALS, supra note 136, at 222.
149. See, e.g., Kuhn, supra note 17, at 249.
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This second presumption is more consistent with the key assump-
tions now made by almost all courts about jurors and their ability to be
fair. It is noteworthy that Swain, Wheeler, and Soares all have a com-
mon thread: all three decisions assume that the jury pool that remains
after a fair draw and the exercise of challenges for cause is a jury of
persons all of whom are fairly eligible for service in the particular case
for which they are called. Furthermore, under either the Swain test or
that proposed in Wheeler and Soares, there is no requirement that
members of any group be represented on any particular jury. Thus,
when no members of a particular group happen to be called, or when
they are called and are stricken on the basis of individual bias, courts
deem the jury composed of members of the remaining groups to be fair.
We believe that if such juries are fair, they are not made less so when
jurors are removed by a party who believes that members of some
groups are more hostile to him than are members of other groups.
Once peremptories are exercised on the basis of group affiliations, the
parties are in the same position as they would be if no juror of the
stricken group had been randomly called or if some were called and
removed either for cause or peremptorily for individual bias.
Our view then is that the use of challenges should always be for
one purpose - to screen the jurors perceived by the parties as most
likely to be at the extreme ends of community sentiment and, therefore,
as less likely than others to be fair. We know of no way to justify the
rule articulated in Wheeler and Soares that permits exclusion of some,
but not all, groups if a court truly believes in a cross-section require-
ment. If courts conclude, as Swain did and we do, that the spectrum
approach to a jury pool is a valid one, parties can use the proxies in
which they have the most faith when deciding whom to strike. If the
contrary assumption is made, then Wheeler and Soares are hardly an
adequate remedy for an enormous problem. 5 '
150. Although we reject the presumption that there are majority and minority interests so
opposed to one another that replacing a juror who belongs to the minority with one from the
majority substitutes a readily identifiable majority view for a readily identifiable opposing
minority view, we do not pretend that no case will ever divide a community into hostile
camps. Such cases may arise. See, e.g., Harris, Pickens County Flare- Up. The Story of Two
Blacks Found Guilty, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1982, at A6, col. 1 (reporting a conviction of two
black voting rights advocates under questionable circumstances). To deal with them we
would invoke other safeguards. First, we would be much more willing than are most courts
to grant a change of venue whenever a reasonable likelihood of community prejudice is
established. A change of venue can avoid community hostility. See generally McConahay,
Mullin & Frederick, supra note 116. Second, we would permit more extensive voir dire of
jurors in cases in which some atypical community interest is evident. Third, we would urge
trial judges and appellate courts to review the record for sufficiency of the evidence more
carefully in highly emotional cases and to be willing to grant new trials where the evidence is
[VOL. 41
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
D. Overall Assessment
Wheeler and Soares appear to view the cross-section requirement
as posing a conflict with the use of peremptory challenges on the basis
of group affiliations. But it seems that Swain is more consistent with
the theory underlying the cross-section decision in Taylor than are the
recent state court decisions. The rationale for requiring that a jury pool
be drawn from a cross-section of the community is that wholesale ex-
clusion of groups may well produce a partial jury. In other words, the
inclusion of select groups combined with the exclusion of others may
produce a pool that is more favorable to one side, usually the govern-
ment that decides whom to include and exclude, than a pool chosen
from the entire community. By assuring that the pool is chosen indif-
ferently, the Supreme Court has attempted to guarantee that the selec-
tion process does not intentionally favor either side when prospective
jurors are summoned. Challenges for cause and peremptory strikes
then work to assure that the jury actually chosen does not include per-
sons who appear to be partial to either side. What should remain after
all challenges and strikes are exhausted is a jury that has been fairly
drawn from the community and that contains a broad core of various
segments of the community. The prospective jurors regarded as reflect-
ing extremes of community values or feelings may have been removed,
but a representative and neutral body should remain.
In a case in which a party believes that a group is likely to be very
partial against him or for the other side, Wheeler and Soares may com-
pel the party to accept members of that group as jurors. Swain would
not. Impartiality is the key to both the cross-section requirement and
the provision of peremptory challenges. If someone develops a better
calculus of bias, there is every reason to believe that litigants will use it.
Until then, judging people on the basis of stereotypes is probably a
necessary part of any peremptory challenge system. In California and
Massachusetts, the stereotypes change, but litigants still use group affil-
iations to make peremptory challenges. They simply are denied the use
barely sufficient but the verdict nevertheless is questionable. Fourth, we would suggest that
jurisdictions that are concerned about disparate outcomes might consider sentencing guide-
lines to control disparities among defendants. See generally Perlman & Stebbins, Implement-
ing an Equitable Sentencing System The Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing and
CorrectionsAct, 65 VA. L. REv. 1175 (1979). Fifth, we would remind courts of the possibil-
ity of breathing life into selective prosecution cases - e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448
(1962) - when racial minorities appear to be prosecuted for improper reasons. Finally, we
would suggest that it may be wise to require prosecutors to formulate general guidelines to
promote evenhanded treatment of potential defendants. See generally Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521 (1981). In the rare case that divides
the community, Wheeler and Soares afford inadequate protection.
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of the stereotypes that they believe are most valid. Swain assumes that
the litigants will choose to strike the jurors that are most likely to disfa-
vor them. This appears to be just what the peremptory challenge sys-
tem should entitle them to do, unless judges can demonstrate that they
indeed know better than litigants which jurors are likely to be partial.
E. Wheeler and Soares
Wheeler and Soares fail to recognize that all peremptory chal-
lenges are likely to be made because of the parties' feelings about the
class, group, or niche into which prospective jurors seem to fit. They
fail to explain why group characteristics that are the most obvious and
that in the courts' own eyes most clearly differentiate among people in
a community are not better than others for screening out partiality.
And they do not realize that litigants who choose bad proxies pay the
price in terms of bad results at trial. Thus, Wheeler and Soares are not
steps forward and should not replace Swain as part of federal constitu-
tional law.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO WHEELER and SORES
Although the argument has now been made that no restrictions
such as those created in the recent state cases should be placed on the
use of peremptory challenges as a matter of constitutional law, surely
no one would suggest that the existing system of challenges is perfect.
The exclusion of certain groups from juries is troublesome because it
does limit minority participation in the legal process and it does
threaten to remove different voices from juries unnecessarily. Changes
in the jury selection process would tend to lessen the diffusion of mi-
nority input on juries.
A. Random Selection
The aspect of Swain that remains disturbing is the Court's failure
to find a prima facie case of discrimination on the facts presented. To-
day, with voting lists, driver's license lists, telephone books and other
samples of community membership available, there is no excuse for the
continuation of a system that relies on officials to select jurors from
people known to them or their associates when such a system produces
underrepresentation of identifiable groups in the community.'15 At a
151. Thus, Swain itself should be decided differently if similar facts are again presented.
Although the Court seems to be more sensitive to discrimination claims today when random
selection is not employed, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 58, it does not flatly condemn
all disparities produced by such systems. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499-501
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minimum, any disparity 52 between the percentage of various identifi-
able groups in the community 53 and the percentage of these groups
within jury pools should be impermissible if a jurisdiction does not use
a random selection system based on some list compiled for a purpose
that would not suggest favoritism along race, sex or other unacceptable
lines. "'54 The disparity in Swain should never be tolerable today. If
groups are fully represented in the pool, there is a greater chance of
minority representation on particular juries.
Courts might even consider going further, requiring random selec-
tion even if no identifiable groups are excluded.155 This would be some
recognition that even within a single group, such as a racial or religious
group, there may be identifiable subgroups that are thought to be less
favorable to the government and that would be intentionally kept from
the jury pool. Defendants in criminal cases cannot go out and formu-
late their own lists and compel the prosecution to select jurors from it.
Why should the state be allowed to do so? There is no way of knowing
whether a jury pool is "loaded" by the officials who handpick the mem-
bers. And there is no reason to rely on handpicking in this modem era
of technology and information gathering. The point was made earlier
(1977). If the approach advocated here were adopted, cases like Commonwealth v. Carroll,
443 Pa. 518, 278 A.2d 898 (1971) (upholding use of key man system despite statistical dispar-
ity) and Sam v. State, 310 So. 2d 923 (Miss.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975), (requiring a
showing of a significant, not just any, statistical disparity), would be decided differently.
152. One case suggested that a standard deviation test might be adopted to determine
whether statistical evidence qualifies as prima facie proof of discrimination. Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977).
153. If this suggestion is adopted, additional groups can receive the protection of the rule,
because the remedy of random selection is so readily available.
154. Using lists not compiled for jury purposes provides some guarantee that the govern-
ment is not stacking the jury pool. If a list is thought to be underrepresentative of minority
groups, it should not be used. The type of additional list that would be least helpful is one in
which those called as jurors are asked to list the names of other potential jurors. Whatever
defects are present in the initial selection are likely to be carried over on such additional
lists.
For cases expressing concern about neutral selection, see Henson v. Wyrick, 634
F.2d 1080, 1083 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1417 (1981); Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d
172, 174-75 (8th Cir. 1978). State v. Alexander, 620 S.W.2d 380, 384-86 (Mo. 1981), also
illustrates the danger of bias when state officers pick the veniremen. There, a sheriff selected
additional veniremen once the petit jury list was exhausted. Although the court found no
proof of bias in selection, it could not demonstrate that the sheriff did not gravitate toward
people known to him, and it could not establish that these people did not know that it was
the sheriff who had chosen them for service. See also Thompson v. White, 661 F.2d 103 (8th
Cir. 1981) (finding constitutional violation where sheriff picked entire jury panel in case
involving shooting of law enforcement officer).
155. Cf. State v. Nims, 180 Conn. 589, 430 A.2d 1306 (1980) (holding jury selection sys-
tem was bad when clerk kept names of men and women separate, even if juries ended up
balanced).
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that peremptories are not very useful if the initial pool is stacked. Ran-
dom selection is the best guarantee against stacking.
It is possible to require the use of more than one source of names,
at least where officials learn that a single source produces under-
representation of an identifiable group. A voter registration list thus
may be valid when it is first used, but invalid standing alone if under-
representation of a group on juries becomes obvious. The decision
whether to require supplementary lists involves a judgment as to how
far the selection process should go in ferreting out people who would
give up benefits like voting or driving to avoid jury service. If forced to
serve despite their commitment not to do so, they might be hostile to
the government. It is arguable that the legal system is justified in at-
tempting to identify as jurors only the pool of persons who show at
least some willingness to bear civic responsibilities. Voter registration
lists are a useful place to start, for no one need have property to be
qualified to vote. There are many reasons why people do not register,
however. If there is any history of discrimination in voting, requiring
at least one supplementary list would be justifiable.
We can eliminate disparities between representation of groups in
the general population and on juries immediately. No additional data
is needed to justify'appropriate steps. 156 While they are taken, we can
decide whether to go even further to assure neutral selection of the
pool.
B. The Number of Peremptories
Previously we suggested that there is an internal check on the exer-
cise of peremptory challenges: the opportunity costs associated with
challenging one juror rather than another. This internal control mech-
anism is frustrated, however, when either the prosecution or the de-
fense has too many challenges. The incentive to use one's challenges
responsibly - i.e., to identify partiality rather than to indulge a per-
sonal taste for discrimination - diminishes when a party has so many
peremptories that mistakes are not very costly. The solution may be to
reduce the number of challenges available to each side. This reduction
156. For suggested approaches to increase jury pools, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at
98-104; Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness.', Alandatefor Multile Source
Lists, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 776, 819-826 (1977). Some proposals also contemplate cutting back
on the number of excuses now recognized. This may be desirable, but it is unclear whether
such a step would increase minority participation. Some of the excused groups involve oc-
cupations that may themselves suffer from too few minority members.
For an innovative argument that exclusive use of voter lists infringes voting rights,
see Note, The Constitutionality of Calling Jurors from Voter Registration Lists, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1266 (1980).
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is best handled as a legislative or supervisory, not a constitutional, mat-
ter. Just as the line between prejudices and values is difficult to draw,
so too is it impossible to know how many challenges are enough to
remove the one without eliminating the other. Such a line might de-
pend on the facts of a particular case, the nature of the crime, the iden-
tities of the victim and the defendant, and the existence of strong
community sentiment in favor of or against one party. For instance, in
a case with significant racial and political overtones, such as the Huey
Newton trial, it is reasonable to assume that the community as a whole
was strongly biased in favor of the prosecution. 157 It therefore might be
necessary to provide the defendant with additional challenges, or to
reduce those of the prosecutor to insure selection of the most impartial
jury available. Such a case illustrates the need for flexibility in grant-
ing challenges, and thus the inadequacy of constitutional decisionmak-
ing to deal with the problem.
Another related option would be to reduce generally the prosecu-
tor's challenges even more than those of the defendant. There are at
least two reasons for choosing this option. First, a few studies have
shown that sixty percent of prospective jurors do not accept the notion
that a criminal defendant is presumed innocent.'5 8 If this is true, then
the prosecution has a built-in advantage in every trial, and the defend-
ant may need more challenges to remove the jurors most strongly
predisposed toward the prosecution. Second, it is the unusual case
where there is strong public opinion running against the government
when it prosecutes crime. Although an unpopular or other extraordi-
nary event may produce an exceptional amount of hostility toward the
government, ordinarily the government appears to be acting for the
people. More typically, any strong bias is against a defendant. Thus,
the prosecutor needs fewer strikes to eliminate the jurors biased against
the state, while the defendant may need more to compensate for the
prejudice against him. Some commentators maintain that this situation
exists every time the defendant is black, citing the conclusion of the
157. See Blauner, Sociology in the Courtroom. The Search for White Racism in the Voir
Dire in MINIMIZING RACISM IN JURY TRIALS, supra note 136, at 43-71.
One reason why it might be reasonable to assume that juries are not likely to disfa-
vor the prosecution in criminal cases is that an acquitted defendant may well be released in
the community. Thus, jurors have an incentive to protect themselves against acquittals of
persons they believe to be guilty. In some cases - e.g., where the crime involves gambling
or some other offense not thought to be dangerous - jurors might be more sympathetic to
defendants.
Arguably, peremptory challenges for the prosecution ought to be greatly restricted or
eliminated except in cases in which there is some reason to suspect that jurors might view the
government as oppressing ordinary citizens.
158. NAT'L JURY PROJECT, supra note 112, at 2.
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Kerner Commission in 1967 that two-thirds of all whites were
prejudiced against blacks. 159 Although reliance on this statistic may be
wholly inappropriate for determining a violation of the sixth amend-
ment, it could support a legislative decision to give minority defendants
- or all defendants - more challenges than the prosecutor.
A few commentators have proposed the elimination of all
prosecutorial challenges.' 60 That proposal, however, ignores both the
state's interest in a jury that is not biased against the prosecution and
the potential danger posed to the defendant's right of challenge. The
abolition of the prosecutor's challenge suggests that representativeness
is the primary goal of petit jury selection, regardless of the bias that
thereby finds its way onto the jury. The acceptance of this theory could
eventually result in the elimination of the defendant's challenge be-
cause it, too, destroys the cross-section secured by random draw. Ar-
guably, we are not yet ready to take such a drastic step.
Another, related way to insure increased representation of minori-
ties on venires, and thus to increase their chance of ultimate selection
on juries, is to reduce or expand the size of the districts from which a
jury is drawn with an eye to providing a better balanced jury pool. If a
district's size were reduced, this might result in a jury that is more rep-
resentative of the defendant's actual "community" than a jury chosen
from a larger area. If the district's size were expanded, there might be
some loss of a sense of community, but this loss might be offset by an
increase in the number of minority jurors available for jury service.
None of these possibilities ought to be constitutionally required.
159. See A. GINGER, supra note 13, § 4.17.
160. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 167; Comment, Curbing ProsecutorialAbuse of
Peremptory Challenges - The Available Alternatives, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 223, 245-46
(1980).
It is possible, but not very likely, that a political check exists that prevents the unrea-
sonable exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecutors. If a group believes that an elected
official is improperly removing its members from juries, it may express dissatisfaction
through the ballot box. However, to have much influence the group must be sufficiently
large. The larger the group the less likely it is that the prosecutor would have attempted to
eliminate its members in the first place, since the larger group is more likely to be viewed as
part of the mainstream of a jurisdiction. Often, excluded groups will be those that have little
influence in the election of a prosecutor. Also, because most prosecutors' offices are staffed
by more than one person (even though only one may be elected), it may be difficult to pin
down responsibility for exclusion of jurors, especially when individual prosecutors do not
have to explain their reasons for exercising strikes. Finally, the political check may be inef-
fectual because the majority of the voters will not be members of groups targeted for exclu-
sion, and they may share the prosecutors' view that excluded groups would be less fair to the
state than are included groups. In jurisdictions where prosecutors are appointed, any polit-
ical check is likely to be even weaker. The official who appoints the prosecutor is unlikely to
be held responsible for abuse of challenges. Even if he were, his duties are likely to involve
issues of more immediate concern to voters.
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However, all are worthy of consideration by legislatures and courts
with rulemaking power. Before they are implemented, more informa-
tion is needed.
We need data on the relationship between the size of the area from
which the jury is drawn and the number of peremptory challenges that
should be available. The number of peremptories may require adjust-
ment in accordance with population. If so, it is not clear in what direc-
tion the adjustment should be made. On the one hand, the smaller the
community, arguably the more likely it is that the inhabitants share
bias. Thus more challenges could be made available in districts with
small populations. On the other hand, a greater number and variety of
biases' may appear in larger communities, creating a need for addi-
tional challenges when population increases. More information is
needed before we can decide whether the size of the community should
determine the number of peremptories and, if so, how to allocate them.
Another question for study is whether community sentiment tends
to run higher in certain classes of cases and whether it tends to run
against one or both parties. It may be possible to provide parties who
are likely to be adversely affected by any such sentiment with addi-
tional challenges - either by statute or rule, or in the discretion of the
trial judge. If sentiment appears to favor one party, a reduction of his
challenges might be warranted.
Too little attention has been paid to the number of peremptory
challenges that are necessary to make the parties and the community
believe that the system has produced a fair jury in the typical case.' 61
We need information.
We already have sufficient information to conclude that jurisdic-
tions concerned about effective minority representation should keep, or
reestablish if necessary, twelve as the appropriate number of trial ju-
rors. As the number decreases so do the chances for effective minority
participation. 162
161. One of the few discussions of what a fair number would be is Kadane & Kairys, Fair
Numbers of Peremptory Challenges in Jury Trialsi 74 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 747, 747 (1979).
162. Williams v. Florida, 399 US. 78 (1970), permits as few as 6 jurors to decide a crimi-
nal case. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), bars juries with fewer than 6 members, and
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), requires that 6 person juries be unanimous. Any
jurisdiction may choose to use 12 jurors. There is evidence that this may work to make
minority voices more significant. See generally Lempert, Uncovering 'Wondiscernible" Dif-
ferences; Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643, 698-99 (1975).
Justice Blackmun recognized in Ballew that when jury size decreases, minority voices may
become less effective. 435 U.S. at 236-37.
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C. Providing Information About Jurors
We can also improve the way we select jurors from a venire. First,
all jurisdictions should ask jurors to fill out a questionnaire that pro-
vides basic background data before calling any jurors in a particular
case. The questionnaire should cover race, sex, religion, current occu-
pation, past occupations, marital status, military experience, criminal
record, education, registered political status, past experience as a juror,
current address, past addresses, and some information about wealth.'63
The parties in any case should receive this information about each
juror.
Although some jurors might prefer to provide no data about them-
selves, it is now well recognized that courts have discretion to require
information as part of voir dire. Voir dire is time consuming, however,
and can tend to be offensive when counsel single out some people for
questions. A simple questionnaire would be preferable.
The more lawyers know about jurors, the more refined their use of
peremptories can be. Race and sex are usually data that are obvious to
the parties and their lawyers. Because other information may be
neither obvious nor available, lawyers may use race, sex, or other ob-
servable characteristics to challenge jurors. Providing the parties with
more facts about jurors should make the internal check on the selection
process more significant. It should underscore the true costs of exercis-
ing a peremptory challenge.
Second, lawyers for the parties should have an opportunity to put
voir dire questions about the particular case to the jurors. Currently,
there is a debate over whether the judge or the lawyers should control
voir dire. Many federal courts permit only the judge to ask ques-
163. This questionnaire would be more comprehensive than some that have been pro-
posed. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 15-2.4 (1978). Some jurisdic-
tions require that a questionnaire be used, although its contents may not be specified. See,
e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1254 (1980), discussedin State v. Thomas, 432 A.2d 757,
759-60 (Me. 1981).
An advantage of a questionnaire is that if many questions are asked and answered in
writing without much expenditure of scarce judicial resources, judges may find that they
have time for more careful questioning of individual jurors outside the hearing of other
jurors. Some jurisdictions require an individual voir dire in some circumstances - MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 28 (West 1959 & 1981 Supp.), discussed in Commonwealth v.
Shelley, 409 N.E.2d 732 (Mass. 1980) - but the requirement usually applies only in excep-
tional circumstances.
Individual voir dire should be encouraged in any case in which there is a reasonable
chance that jurors may be prejudiced against certain classes or groups with which parties or
witnesses will be associated or in which inflammatory issues are present.
164. See supra note 13.
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tions while more states allow lawyers to question jurors. 65 Once the
initial questionnaire is provided to the lawyers, many of their questions
should be unnecessary. But a need to focus on the specific case will
remain.
It should be perfectly acceptable for the judge to approve all ques-
tions asked. The advantage of having the lawyers actually ask them is
that each lawyer has an opportunity to see how a juror reacts to him
and his side of the case. 1 66 Every juror's reactions should be observa-
ble. This should not slow down the process, even minimally.
As for the number of questions, courts must of course be con-
cerned with the time that voir dire takes. But they also should recog-
nize that the more information generated on voir dire, the less likely
the lawyers are to use stereotypes like race, sex, and religion in selecting
jurors.
In every case in which a party reasonably believes that something
in the facts might cause a particularly negative reaction among some
jurors, the court should permit questions to the jurors on that sub-
ject. 167 This does not mean that extended voir dire should be neces-
sary, only that one or possibly a few questions relating to reasonable
fears of prejudice or bias are always proper.
Are any of these procedures constitutionally required? At the mo-
ment there would be little support for arguing that they are.' 68 The
Supreme Court has reiterated that the Constitution does not require
peremptory challenges.'69 Thus the Court is unlikely to view any pro-
cedures surrounding them as constitutional imperatives. One should
165. See STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 15-2.4 commentary at 24 (1978).
166. The appearance of counsel and jurors' reaction to counsel may be important to the
outcome of a case. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 367-68 (1966); See
generally Costopoulos, Persuasion in the Courtroom, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 384 (1972).
167. The Supreme Court has not gone far enough in requiring that basic questions be put
to prospective jurors concerning their possible bias. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101
S. Ct. 1629 (1981) (plurality opinion); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973). Because post-trial challenges are undesirable and greatly
restricted, see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b), there is even more reason before trial begins to
make some brief inquiry about jurors' views. Massachusetts has taken a step in the right
direction in Commonwealth v. Sanders, 421 N.E.2d 436, 438 (Mass. 1981) (requiring jurors
to be individually examined regarding racial bias in cases involving interracial rape, if the
defendant requests such questioning).
California has now gone further than we would require. In People v. Williams, 29
Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981), the court held that counsel could ask
about a juror's willingness to apply a specific doctrine of law as an aid to the exercise of
peremptory challenges.
168. The Supreme Court cases cited supra note 167, suggest that the Constitution imposes
few demands on trial judges who supervise voir dire of jurors.
169. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1629, 1634 n.6 (1981) (plurality opinion),
(citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
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remember, however, that the Supreme Court plainly requires an impar-
tial jury. 7 ° The Court has never assessed the legitimacy of a system of
jury selection that bans peremptory challenges and also treats chal-
lenges for cause as narrowly as most jurisdictions now treat them.
Without a radical change in voir dire and in the use of challenges for
cause, peremptory challenges may be essential to assure the constitu-
tionally mandated impartial jury. If so, the Constitution may require
that a lawyer be permitted to ask questions about bias relating to the
evidence, so that he can evaluate both the substantive responsFs and
the jurors' reactions to him. The more general information provided
on a questionnaire probably would not be constitutionally necessary.
VII. CONCLUSION
Peremptory challenges are essential to the selection of an impartial
jury. Neither random selection nor challenges for cause are adequate
to detect and eliminate the subconscious biases that destroy impartial-
ity. Although the peremptory is better able to perform this function, it
cannot do so effectively if the motives for its exercise are subject to
judicial control in any particular case.
While claiming to preserve the essence of the peremptory, recent
state decisions like Wheeler and Soares effectively reduce its usefulness.
They fail to recognize that while race, religion, ethnic background, oc-
cupation, and age may be only rough proxies for predispositions that
detract from impartiality, given the limitations on and problems with
voir dire of prospective jurors, reliance on stereotypes is the most rea-
sonable and least expensive way for parties to identify probable juror
bias. The attempt to distinguish between the use of group and specific
bias is unsatisfactory; both rely on the use of generalizations and ste-
reotypes to discover which jurors are likely to be most prejudiced to-
ward one side or another.
Although courts should hold peremptories on the basis of group
bias constitutional, there remain strong arguments that the presence of
minorities on petit juries is nonetheless desirable and that currently we
do too little to promote minority representation. These arguments
make a persuasive case that we should strive to improve the system for
selecting neutral jury pools, placing special emphasis on random selec-
tion. We also need to gather information concerning the number of
peremptories needed by both sides and the relationship between this
number and the population of a district in order to decide whether we
170. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 1634; supra text accompanying notes
76-86.
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should decrease challenges in some cases, especially for the
prosecution.
In addition, we should attempt to provide lawyers with more in-
formation about prospective jurors. Increased information wil reduce
reliance on stereotypes that may lead to striking jurors according to
unsatisfactory criteria, unnecessarily depriving minority members of
opportunites for jury service.
The ideal is that juries will be both representative of the commu-
nity and impartial. No single solution like the one suggested in
Wheeler and Soares will help much in achieving that ideal. A broader
program for reform may be more successful. This discussion is an ef-
fort to generate some interest in developing that program.
